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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DISCRIMINATION-LIMITATIONS

Chmill v. Pittsburgh, 375 A.2d 841 (1977).

IMPOSITION OF QUOTAS.
-,

ON THE

Pa. Commw. Ct.

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Chmill v. Pittsburgh'
extended judicial limitations of quotas, 2 holding that preferential treat-

ment cannot be sanctioned when evidence shows that no present racial
discrimination exists. Presented with the issue for the first time, 3 the

majority4 rejected superimposing a racial quota over a competitive list
that actually reflects the necessary qualifications for successful job performance as a remedy for past discrimination. This practice constitutes
reverse discrimination,' in contravention of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, 6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 7
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 8

In August of 1975, approximately 1500 persons took a physical
agility test9 to qualify for employment with the Pittsburgh fire depart1. - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 375 A.2d 841 (1977).
2, See notes 34-42 and accompanying text infra.
3. See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
4. Five judges joined in the majority opinion, while Judge Wilkinson, joined by
Judge Rogers, dissented. For an analysis of the substance and reasoning of the dissenting
opinion, see notes 59 and 67 infra.
5. Although this discussion, of necessity, frequently uses the phrase "reverse discrimination," the term is a misnomer because it refers to one species of discrimination, not
the reverse of it. Nonminorities have traditionally attacked the imposition of quotas under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1975); Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975);
Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). Before
1976, the Civil Rights Act was held to be inapplicable to whites. The Supreme Court
reversed this interpretation in McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
Briefly stated, the landmark decision construed the statute to prohibit racial discrimination
against white persons as well as against non-whites. For a discussion of the import of the
McDonald decision, see 10 AKRON L. REV. 570 (1977).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-716(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1971).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 952, 955 (Purdon 1964).
9. The test included chinning, sand-bag dodge, bend, twist, shuttle-run, and hose
coupling. In 1974 the city discontinued using a written examination and developed the
expanded physical agility test, which was administered after the city advertised extensively
to recruit minority applicants. Brief for Appellant at 5, Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pa. Commw.
Ct. -, 375 A.2d 841 (1977). The discontinuance of the written examination was mandated in
Commonwealth v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974). In that case the written
examination, the basis of ranking applicants for employment with the Pittsburgh fire
department, was rejected as being "culturally biased towards blacks." Id. at 733 n.12.

ment. The 1161 applicants who passed with a score of seventy-five
0 When the
percent or better were ranked in the order of their test scores. 1
city requested the Pittsburgh Civil Service Commission to certify the
names of twenty individuals for positions as firefighters, the Commission

decided to select fifty percent white male candidates and fifty percent

minority11 candidates rather than to certify the twenty individuals at the
top of the competitive list as required by the Civil Service Act. 12 Because
of the quota system, applicants ranking between numbers fifteen and
twenty-one were not hired, and they filed a complaint 3 in equity seeking
an order directing their certification.

The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denied the requested relief, holding that although the Commission's action clearly

violated the Act, the quota was justified by "higher" laws. 4 On appeal
the commonwealth court reversed the decision of the lower court, ruling
that deviation from the Act "established a clear right to relief for the

[plaintiffs]." 15 The court intimated that "higher" laws take precedence
over the Act only when a potential for discrimination is present. Since the
eligibility examination was not racially biased, the down-the-list approach mandated by the Act would not discriminate against minorities.
The court thus concluded that judicial scrutiny of the issue in light of the
Constitution, Title VII, or the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act was

unnecessary. 16
Under the Civil Service Act, appointments must be made "only
from the top of the competitive list" 17 based on qualifications ascertained
by competitive examinations. 1 8 Although the selection procedure is pre-

scribed by statute, city commissioners and officials enjoy broad discretion in formulating the examinations that determine future eligible applicants. The examination criteria are not insulated from claims of cultural
10. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 847. Thirty-one percent of the passing
candidates were black; only three of these candidates ranked in the top twenty positions on
the competitive list. Id.
1i. In the context of this discussion, "minority" refers to an individual who is not a
white male.
12. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at-, 375 A.2d at 843. The Civil Service Act provides, "Both
original appointments and promotions to any position in the competitive class in any bureau
of fire in any city of the second class shall be made only from the top of the competitive list
PA. STAT.
. ANN. tit. 53, § 23493.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
13. The seven plaintiffs individually filed appeals with the Commission, which were
denied. The trial judge consolidated the statutory appeals from the decisions of the Commissiort with the complaint in equity. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 843.
14. - Pitts. L.J. - (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976). The "higher" laws referred to are the
federal and state constitutions and the federal and state civil rights acts.
15. -Pa. Commw. Ct. at-, 375 A.2d at 844.
16. Id. Although the majority held that an extended review was unnecessary, the
judges discussed plaintiffs' right to relief in light of these laws. The dissenting judges
criticized the majority's analysis of the merits of the case under the "higher" laws,
reasoning that the ramifications of the decision are too "sweeping." See note 59 and
accompanying text infra.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 23493.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
18. Id. § 23431 (Purdon 1957).

bias or racial prejudice in contravention of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment and/or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.19 The Supreme Court recognized this problem in Washington v.
Davis20 when it formulated the rule that any selection process used as the

basis for establishing a competitive list must be racially neutral, both on
its face and in operation. 2 When the process is biased, courts have the
power and duty to insure equal employment opportunities by framing a
22
remedy designed to eliminate the encroachment.

The question the commonwealth court addressed is the extent to
which equal protection will tolerate the imposition of racial quotas designed to remedy the past infringement of an individual's equal employment opportunities. Although the Supreme Court absolutely prohibited
racial classifications when the purpose or effect was to promote discrimi-

nation or enforce segregation, 23 the Court upheld such classifications
when the state could show a compelling interest.24 Classifications based
on race were also permissible when the purpose of the particular governmental activity was to insure equal protection of the laws.2 5 "Where [a
19. It is not an "unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Civil Rights Act of 1964, §716(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2003-2(h) (1971).
20. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Unsuccessful black applicants to the District of Columbia
police department brought a class action alleging that the eligibility examination was racially
discriminatory because a disproportionate number of minority applicants failed the test.
Since Title VII was not applicable to the federal government at the time the action
commenced, the Court resolved the issue solely on the constitutional question. Id. at 236-37
n.6.
21. Id. at 241. Racial discrimination within the intent of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment cannot be demonstrated solely by a disproportionate impact.
Such impact, though relevant, is merely a "touchstone" to resolving the constitutional
issue. The neutral standard requires that there be evidence of intent or purpose to discriminate by reason of race. Id. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973)
(school desegregation); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (district boundaries). But
see Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (division of a school district).
22. "[T]he court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will
so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). See,
e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d
1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974).
23. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (statutes governing jury selection);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (statutes permitting or requiring segregation
of public school children); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'dper
curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (prison regulation requiring segregation of races).
24. The compelling state interest test was perceptively phrased by Justice White in
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). "[A] law, even though enacted pursuant to a
valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is
necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy." Id. at 196. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew on
Americans of Japanese ancestry in time of war); Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases-A
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
25. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970) (zoning);
Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affl'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (public
housing).

racial classification] is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality it will
be allowed, and to the extent it is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by

race, it will be required." 2 6
These principles are applied by courts when they fashion remedies
aimed at abolishing employment practices that are repugnant to the
principle of equal protection or to Title VII. 27 Thus, a court can impose
racial quotas or uphold employer-initiated affirmative action programs if
the remedy is necessary to avoid unequal treatment by race. This solu-

tion, however, is subject to constitutional attack if it unjustifiably infringes on the rights of nonminorities. 28 The unresolved validity of this
principle and the inescapable severity of such a decree have led courts to
proceed cautiously in tailoring a remedy that will correct discriminatory
practices and still minimize the burden placed on the nonminority
group.2 9
While the Supreme Court has not reached the question whether

quotas are unconstitutional per se, 30 it has approved the use of quotas as a
starting point for fashioning a remedy to eliminate the present manifestations of past discrimination." In the same context, preferential treatment
has not been prohibited by Title VII. At least nine circuits 32 have deter26. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir.
1968).
27. See Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Anti-discriminationLaw in
the Second DecadeAfterBrown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974); 34 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 130 (1972); 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 339 (1976).
28. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971). Minority applicants to the
Minneapolis fire department sought an injunction against the administration of a written
examination to determine eligibility. The district court granted the injunction and imposed a
quota giving absolute preference to minorities. The court of appeals, holding that an
absolute preference would "operate as a present infringement on nonminorities," reversed
the lower court's decision and framed a remedy based on an alternating ratio. Accord,
Bridgeport Guardians v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally
Note, The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination, and Voluntary
Compliance, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 369 (1977).
29. See United States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977). "Preferential numerical relief [is] an extraordinary remedy and its use must be justified by the particular
circumstances of each case." Id. at 437; Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975). "Our court has approached the use of quotas in a limited
and 'gingerly' fashion." Id. at 427.
30. It is possible that the Supreme Court will issue a definitive ruling on the constitutionality of quotas in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
For a general discussion of the constitutionality of quotas, see Ely, The Constitutionalityof
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
31. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971). In Swann the Supreme Court
upheld the limited use of a racial quota to implement a remedial order to correct a previously
segregated school system.
32. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976); Crockett v.
Green, 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976); NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Rios
v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971); United States v. International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1970); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969).

mined that "a court may authorize the use of mandatory racial or sexual

' 33
quotas in the exercise of its remedial powers under Title VII.
Nevertheless, the use of quotas is subject to judicially imposed

restrictions not articulated in state or federal legislation. In Griggs v.

Duke Power Co. 34 the Supreme Court established procedural guidelines
for all prospective discrimination cases: after the party alleging unfair
practices presents evidence establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,35 the burden shifts to the employer to prove the validation of the
hiring procedure. 3 6 The burden of validation-the Griggs test-is satis-

fied if the employer proves that the employment examination bears a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job." 7
Following the federal interpretation, the lower court in Chmill acknowledged that the utilization of an invalidated hiring procedure is not
sufficient to warrant mandatory preferential treatment38 and that a court

must balance the rights of both parties with the potential detriment to the
public interest. 39 The elements considered in applying the balancing test
33. United States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. Black employees brought an action alleging discriminatory employment practices
in contravention of Title VII. In resolving the case, the Court provided a set of guidelines for
determining whether an employer's hiring and promotion procedures violate Title VII. The
Court held that a prima facie case of discrimination was sufficiently shown by evidence that
the employment requirements operated to disqualify Blacks at a substantially higher rate
than whites. Id. at 426. Later courts refined this principle, holding that evidence of a
disproportionate racial impact is sufficient to establish prima facie discrimination. United
States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977); Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't,
Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 348
F. Supp. 1084, 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5,-, 367 A.2d 833,
836 (1976).
36. There are three basic methods of validation:
'empirical' or 'criterion' validity (demonstrated by identifying criteria that indicate
successful job performance and then correlating test scores and the criteria so
identified); 'construct' validity (demonstrated by examinations structured to measure the degree to which job applicants have identifiable characteristics that have
been determined to be important in successful job performance; and 'content'
validity (demonstrated by tests whose content closely approximates tasks to be
performed on the job by the applicant).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n. 13 (1976). See Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures, C.F.R. Pt. 1607 (1975).
37. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). But see McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Proof that rejection of an employee was not based on
discriminatory criteria does not necessarily end the inquiry. The party alleging discrimination "must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that
the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover up for a racially
discriminatory decision." Id. at 805; Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in
Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675, 687-88
(1974).
38. Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pitts. L.J. -, - (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976). The need to
consider matters other than validation was implicit in the lower court's decision. Upon
finding that the examination was invalidated, the court applied a balancing test to determine
whether other conditions necessitated the imposition of quotas. Id. at -. On appeal the
commonwealth court accepted this view as controlling in Pennsylvania.
39. Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'g Lutz v. Shapp, 393 F. Supp. 561
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 368 F. Supp. 854 (W.D. Pa. 1972).

are evidence of the history of intentional discrimination,' the efforts of
the employer to correct the racial imbalance,4 l and the urgent need to fill
42
the proposed vacancies.
The Griggs test, which requires that examinations relate to successful job performance, also applies to claims that quotas discriminate
against nonminorities. Cases of reverse discrimination are necessarily
founded on the proposition that the individual not offered employment is
better qualified for the position than a minority candidate hired through
the application of a quota system. 4 3 The court of common pleas' statement in Chmill that "[h]igher scores on tests do not control unless the
'manifest relation' between the standard and the job is established," '
demonstrates the correlation between "qualifications" and the examination. If the examination bears a "manifest relation" to successful job
performance (i.e., it meets the Griggs test of validation), the test scores
45
properly reflect qualification.
The lower court determined that the Griggs test was not satisfied in
Chmill because the applicants in question were "not ranked with precision, statistical validity or predictive significance.' ' 6 Although the
Commission violated the express words of the Civil Service Act that
"appointments . . .shall be made only from the top of a competitive
list," 4 7 the court concluded that the departure from the procedure mandated by the Act was not sufficient to require the requested relief. "The

federal and state civil rights acts and the federal and state constitutions
take precedence over the civil service acts where the potential of dis40. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 427 (2d
Cir. 1975); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 1971). Cf.
Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976),
cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811) (the past history of
discrimination need not be intentional). But see Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio,
493 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1974); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1257 n.4 (3d Cir. 1970)
(sufficient evidence showing the existence of present discrimination nullifies the need to
find that the employer discriminated in the past).
41. United States v. Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976); Erie
Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974).
42. Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. Sebastian, 368 F. Supp. 854, 855 (W.D. Pa. 1972); accord, Commonwealth v.
Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724, 735 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
43. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot,
416 U.S. 312 (1974) (school admissions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971)
(fire department).
44.

Chmill v. Pittsburgh, -

Pitts. L.J. -,

-

(Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976). The court, in

approving employer-initiated quotas, refuted the argument that preferential treatment given
to minorities would result in rejecting better qualified applicants whose eligibility was
determined by the results of an invalidated examination. Id.
45. The Griggs test requires that the criteria utilized for a selection process reflect
only those factors necessary for successful performance. The factors, by necessity, represent the qualifications deemed essential for the job. See generally Comment, Color-Conscious Quota Relief: A Constitutional Remedy for Racial Employment Discrimination, 11
URB. L. ANN. 333 (1976).
46.

47.

Chmill v. Pittsburgh, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,

Pitts. L.J. -,

-

(Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976).

§ 23493.1 (Purdon Supp. 1977).

criminatory application is present."48 Relying on both federal decisions
approving preferential hiring 49 and the proposition that the preferred

means of complying with Title VII is through employer-initiated affirmative action programs, 50 Judge Watson upheld the quota system.

On appeal, the commonwealth court discerned one error in the lower
court's reasoning: the sole basis for determining eligibility, physical
agility, met the Griggs test because the examination tested only those
factors necessary for successful job performance."' The precedent relied

on by the lower court was not controlling because an essential ingredient
present in all cases cited-invalidated criteria-was absent in Chmill.52
In the well-reasoned decision, the court opined that the "higher"
laws did not transcend the applicable civil service statute because the laws
interact only when a potentialfor present discriminationexists. 53 Since
the examination was not inherently discriminatory, the Commission's
voluntary implementation of a quota system unquestionably resulted in
rejecting better qualified applicants. Hence, the court held that the purposeful violation of the Act "established a clear right to relief" for the
plaintiffs.'
The superimposition of a quota over a valid competitive list pre-

sented a unique legal question: may quotas be imposed to remedy the
effects of past discrimination when utilization of a validated examination
48. - Pitts. L.J. at -.
49. Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Erie Human RelationsiComm'n v.
Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971);
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1971); Porcelli v. Titus, 431
F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970). The commonwealth court distinguished these cases from Chmill
because all the decisions were based on evidence that the employer utilized invalidated
selection criteria. Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, -, 375 A.2d 841, 847-48
(1977).
50. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
51.
Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, -, 375 A.2d 841, 847. The court of
common pleas did not expound on its determination that the examination was invalidated.
On appeal, the commonwealth court declared that the examination met the Griggs test
because it was constructed and administered to test for those factors essential to successful
job performance. The court based this finding on evidence that the examination tested only
physical agility and was presided over by impartial examiners.
In Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Pa. 1975), the district court, in
framing a remedy to redress discriminatory practices in a police department, acknowledged
that a physical agility test would be a valid "measure of ability to perform the critical
functions of a police officer .
Id. at 1026. Although the district court's statement
!..."
speaks in terms of police officers, it is obviously not limited to that branch of the civil
service. Firefighters, like policemen, are required to be "quick on their feet"; an examination that tests for such physical agility must be considered job-related.
52. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
53. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 844. The court's holding that the antidiscriminatory laws are inapplicable when no present discrimination exists is a circular statement because, unless these laws are invoked, the existence of present discrimination is
impossible to discern. That the court implicitly found the statement circular is evident in its
determination that the examination met both the constitutional and statutory standards.
54. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 844. The court accepted the principle that
the hiring of employees for the civil service must conform to the statutes regulating the civil
service. This principle was deemed controlling in Chmill because the "higher" laws, which
govern only if a selection process is discriminatory, were not applicable. Id.

verifies that there is no present discrimination? 55 Judge Mencer, speaking
for the majority, stated that the quota would not be justified even if the
"higher" laws were deemed applicable. The Human Relations Act ex-

plicitly prohibits any discrimination against an applicant "if the individual is the best able and most competent to perform the services required." 56 Title VII states that an employer is not required to "grant
preferential treatment . . . on account of an imbalance which may
exist." 57 Literally construing the Human Relations Act and Title VII, the

court determined that the lower court erred in concluding that the provisions require "a result different from that which would be achieved by
adherence to the provisions of the applicable civil service act. "58 This
interpretation is significant because of the implication that Chmill is not
59
limited to cases involving violations of a civil service statute.

Constitutional protection could not support the argument that strict
compliance with the down-the-list approach, which would result in offer-

ing employment to three minority candidates, discriminated against
minorities. The court embraced the rule, established in Washington v.
Davis,' that a racially neutral law or other official act is not unconstitu55. Chmill is unique because the quota was imposed solely to amend the present
manifestations of past discrimination. Courts that have imposed or upheld quotas have done
so only after determining that the employment practices created present or impending
discrimination. Proof of past discrimination is of secondary importance and is considered
only in applying a balancing test. See notes 39 and 40 and accompanying text supra. In
Chmill there was no present or impending discrimination, yet the Commission voluntarily
instituted a quota system to redress past discrimination.
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 955 (Purdon 1964).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1971). The court found that
Title VII supported its conclusion that the quota violated the antidiscriminatory laws. Title
VII requires "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, -, 375 A.2d 841, 846
(1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1977)).
58. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 846.
59. If the Chmill decision had been based solely on the deviation from the civil service
statutes, the case would serve as a limited precedent, affirming the established view in
Pennsylvania that applicants to the civil service must be selected according to the procedure
mandated by the statutes regulating the civil service. Because the court also resolved the
controversy under the Constitution, Title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
Chmill applies to non-civil service cases when the imposition of a quota results in rejecting
better-qualified nonminority applicants.
In his dissenting remarks, Judge Wilkinson criticized the court's extended analysis of
the state and federal civil rights acts, contending that the "majority opinion is far more
sweeping" than is necessary to resolve the issue. The dissenting judges also expressed
disagreement with the majority's opinion that "affirmative action programs are not authorized by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and are in fact contrary to it and the
constitution," reasoning that the court's opinion is inconsistent with its prior decisions
ordering desegregation of schools. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 849. This reasoning
is inaccurate for two reasons. First, the majority did not denounce quotas per se, but rather
the use of a quota when it creates an unjustifiable infringement on the rights of nonminorities to enjoy equal employment opportunities. Second, while an individual possesses
a constitutional right to equal protection, there is no constitutional right to segregated
education. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F. 2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

tional merely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. 6' The
selection procedure articulated in the Act appears racially neutral on its

face because it requires appointment by merit only. 62 It is neutral in
operation because the method used in the determination of merit or

qualification contained no racial bias.
The court's reasoning is consistent with the prevailing judicial view
restricting the imposition of quotas. The holding is, in effect, an extension of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,63 which established preliminary

guidelines for determining the legality of an employer's hiring and promoting procedure under Title VII, and Washington v. Davis,6 which
provided the constitutional standard. 65 Chmill specifically added the
restriction that a quota cannot be instituted solely to amend past discrimination.

The lower court acknowledged that the past history of discrimination, the efforts of the employer to correct the imbalance, and the
nonexistence of alternative means to bar discrimination are matters to be
considered before granting remedial quotas.66 The commonwealth court
added to that list the source of the quota. Concluding that if a quota is a
necessary remedy, the court declared that it must come by judicial decree

and "not by a subjective, individualized selection process by the employer where there is no opportunity objectively to ascertain its necessity. "67

The court's stance reflects the underlying theme in its opinion that racial
quotas are constitutionally objectionable and "derogatory of and pa-

tronizing to the intended beneficiary minority. '"
61.

See notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text supra.

62.

-

Therefore, the court

Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 846.

63. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
64. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. There is a significant difference between the quantity of evidence needed to
substantiate a violation of Title VIt and the quantity needed to show a constitutional
violation. Under Title VII, a disproportionate impact is sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination; this shifts the burden to the employer to prove that the
selection criterion is significantly related to successful job performance. Racial discrimination within the equal protection clause cannot be demonstrated solely by a racially disproportionate impact; there must be evidence of intent or purpose to discriminate because of
race. United States v. Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977).
66. Chmill v. Pittsburgh, - Pitts. L.J. - (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1976).
67. - Pa. Commw. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 848. The court's proposition that quotas
cannot be voluntarily initiated was prefaced by the statement that "reverse discrimination
. . .is as objectionable and unconstitutional when the preference is voluntarily initiated by
the employer as it would be if compelled by a court." Id. (emphasis added). This is a
specious declaration because quotas are not unconstitutional per se. See note 30 and
accompanying text supra. Viewed in conjunction, the majority's statements that quotas are
unconstitutional and must result from judicial decree imply that a court can order an action,
which, if done voluntarily by an employer, would be unconstitutional. Judge Wilkinson
adamantly dissented from the majority's comment, asserting that a properly motivated
affirmative action program is neither objectionable nor unconstitutional and an employer
should be permitted to do voluntarily what can be ordered by a court. Id. at -, 375 A.2d at
849.
68. Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 844. This statement in Chmill approximates the sentiments
of two black civil rights leaders who, in expressing their views that the dangers inherent in
quotas outweigh any temporary gain, stated,

proposed that any racial classification must be created by judicial decree
69
to insure legal, objective evaluation of the facts and circumstances.
Difficulties with this position may arise because it conflicts with the
prevailing view of the Supreme Court and the Equal Employment Opporare the
tunity Commission 70 that cooperation and voluntary compliance
71
preferred means for achieving the goals of Title VII.
Chmill establishes a threshold beyond which the imposition of a
quota constitutes discrimination in the reverse. This point is surpassed
when the application of a quota results in hiring minority candidates less
qualified for the job than nonminority candidates for the sole purpose of
creating a racial balance. By proposing this principle, Chmill suggests a
valid procedure that other courts could follow in evaluating whether a
proposed quota infringes on the rights of nonminorities to enjoy equal
employment opportunities. The suggested procedure is soundly based on
the proposition that the laws and precedent justifying the imposition of
quotas are the same criteria that must be considered in resolving claims of
reverse discrimination.
Quotas would further entrench the tendency of society to respond to the call
for equal opportunity with tokenism. Quotas, in fact, are tokenism taken to its
logical conclusion. Blacks object to the token because it downgrades the dignity
and abilities of the individual, cheapening both his or her accomplishments and the
accomplishments of other blacks to follow. The same is true of the quota, only to a
greater degree. The black who benefits from the quota suffers the uncertainty of
never knowing whether he made it on his merits, or was simply hired to meet a
government decree.
Federal Higher Education Programs-InstitutionalEligibility: Hearings on Civil Rights
Obligations Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 253 (1974) (statement of Bayard Rustin and Norman Hill).
69. Only one court provided precedent for the holding that if any preferential treat-

ment is needed to overcome discrimination, it must come by judicial decree. In Reeves v.
Eaves, 411 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ga. 1976), the district court, without citing any authority for

its view, declared that a quota can be imposed only by court decree.
70. The EEOC is charged with the enforcement of Title VII. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
§ 716(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1971).
71. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); EEOC v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Glickman, 370
F. Supp. 724, 736 (W.D. Pa. 1974). According to EEOC guidelines, the employer is obligated

"to take positive action in affording employment and training to members of classes
protected by title VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1976).

[Casenote by Patricia J. Chanson]

CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR COURT REJECTS
THE "YEAR AND A DAY" RULE IN HOMICIDE PROSECUTIONS. State

v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977).

In State v. Young,' the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of
New Jersey affirmed a conviction for second degree murder and in so
doing rejected the common law "year and a day" rule. 2 This rule had
created the equivalent of a conclusive presumption 3 that the victim died
from natural causes, thus precluding prosecution of the accused for
homicide, unless death occurs within a year and one day of the criminal
assault. 4 Under its operation an indictment is fatally defective when it
does not aver that death occurred within the time limit.5

On September 17, 1972, Roosevelt Young shot Samuel Story after
he had discovered Story at the home of Young's estranged wife. One
bullet wound caused severe damage to the spinal cord of the victim and

resulted in his complete paralysis below the neck. Story remained under
medical care until his death on November 17, 1973, one year and sixtythree days after the shooting. Young was indicted for murder, 6 and he
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the charge alleging that prosecution was
barred by the "year and a day" rule. At his trial it was established that

death was caused by "pneumonia secondary to a state of quadraplegia
[sic] due to the gunshot wounds." 7 Young appealed from his conviction,
contending that the trial judge erred by refusing to apply the rule to
1. 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977), petition for cert. docketed
No. A-3312-74 (N.J. April 1, 1977).
2. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 2, § 1, at 28 (2d ed. 1969); 40 AM. JUR. 2d
Homicide § 14 (1968). Although the rule has been considered almost exclusively in the
context of murder prosecutions, it has been applied in other cases. In Connor v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. 714, 719 (1878) (dictum), the rule was held applicable to murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter prosecutions. In State v. Warner, 237 A.2d 150
(Me. 1967), a conviction for reckless homicide by auto was affirmed, in part, because death
occurred within the statutory requirement of one year. The pertinent Maine statute, ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 29, § 1315 (1974), was repealed, however, in 1975.
3. PERKINS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § 1, at 28. The doctrine does not alter the significance of the facts, but it merely precludes issuance of process when the period has
transpired. See Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 173, 166 A.2d 501, 506 (1960).
4. Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959); 40 C.J.S.2d
Homicide, § 12 (1944).
5. F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE § 18, at 19 (3d ed. 1907). The indictment is
valid, however, if it can be implied from the date of filing that the time limitations were
satisfied. See Manning v. State, 123 Ga. App. 844, 182 S.E.2d 690 (1971); Sizemore v.
Commonwealth, 347 S.W.2d'77 (Ky. 1961).
6. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-2 (West 1969). While Story was still alive, Young was
indicted for assault with intent to kill, id. at § 2A:90-2, and assault with an offensive
weapon, id. at § 2A:90-3. All three indictments were consolidated for trial after Story's
death.
7. 148 N.J. Super. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1119.

dismiss the murder indictment. 8 Although the superior court considered

the rule "a constituent element of the basic law of this state" 9 because
New Jersey constitutions had consistently adopted the English common

law,' 0 it also rejected the rule, characterizing it as an inequitable anachronism,"l and sustained the conviction.
The rule was principally an expedient formulated during the primitive state of medieval medical science.' 2 During that period,' 3 proof of
the cause of death was little more than mere speculation when death

followed an injury by a considerable lapse of time. 14 The rule thus served
as a safeguard against convictions when they could only be secured

through conjecture,' 5 but was also applied as a statute of limitations. 16 In
later cases, however, courts utilized it as a substantive element of the
definition of murder,' 7 or a procedural 18 or evidentiary' 9 prerequisite to

prosecution for murder.
The view that the rule is purely procedural has now been universally
rejected.20 Although the present dual classification of the rule as either

substantive or evidentiary may determine the manner in which it will be
applied, these rubrics are of little benefit in determining whether the rule
will be judicially accepted or rejected. 2 Most jurisdictions that have
8. Id. at 408, 372 A.2d at 1119. Young advanced four other contentions on appeal: (1)
plain error was committed when the trial judge failed to ascertain the degree of guilt in
accepting the verdict, (2) the sentence for second degree murder was excessive because it
was based on the judge's improper conclusion that first degree murder had been committed,
(3) the sentence was excessive and unduly punitive, and (4) the two assault convictions had
been merged with the murder conviction. The court summarily dismissed the first three
contentions and vacated the convictions for the two lesser offenses. 1d. at 414, 372 A.2d at
1122.
9. 148 N.J. Super. at 409, 372 A.2d at 1119.
10. Id.
I1. Id. at 412, 372 A.2d at 1121.
12.

C. KENNEY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 684 (19th ed. 1966); 65 DICK L. REV. 166,

170 (1961).
13. 3 E.
14.

COKE, INSTITUTES *53; R. PERKINS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § 1, at 28.
W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES § 10.00, at 602 (7th ed. 1967);

Cooley, Constitutional Law, 23 U. PTrT L. REV. 263, 265 (1961).
15. See State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974). In the early English
courts, juries returned verdicts based upon their personal knowledge of the facts without the
aid of expert testimony on the causation issue. Brief for Appellee at 26 n.4, State v. Young,
148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977); D. THAYER, EVIDENCE 174 (1898).

16. In Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 985, 987 (1558) it was observed that the rule ran
from the time of the victim's death. Coke reasoned that the observation was proper because
only when life ceased was the person murdered, "and not after the stroke or poison given, &
C." COKE, supra note 13 at *52. Contra, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *197.
17. See State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 411, 372 A.2d 1117, 1120 (App. Div.
1977). See also 65 DICK. L. REV. 166, 167 (1961); 46 IOWA L. REV. 883, 885 (1961).

18. See Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d
1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (treating the rule as procedural, though analyzing it as
substantive); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960) (treating the rule as
procedural or evidentiary).
19. See People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1972); State v. Brown,
21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
20.

See 65 DICK. L. REV. 166, 167 (1961).

21. In Young, the rule was considered substantive and was rejected. But see State v.
Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940), in which the rule was held to be substantive, but was

considered the current propriety of the
rule have upheld it22 and have
23

viewed it as a rule of substantive law.

In recent years the rule has been upheld for a variety of reasons.
Application of the rule was affirmed in State v. Brown 4 because the
Maryland Court of Appeals was unwilling to denounce the rule as anachronistic. The Brown tribunal expressed its reluctance to find that such a

fixed rule was unrealistic or did not serve any useful purpose. The Brown
opinion exemplifies the judicial regard for some form of limitation on
causation. 2 5 This partially explains the courts' hesitance to abrogate the
rule and their recurring delcaration that any modification of the rule must
be made by the legislature. 26 Courts and commentators have frequently
suggested that the legislature is the proper body to determine the appropriate status of the doctrine because its decision will be inherently more
representative than that of the judiciary .27
affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in rejecting the rule, treated it as evidentiary or
procedural. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960). A Maryland court
also found that the rule was evidentiary, but upheld it. State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 318
A.2d 257 (1974).
22. Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1323 (1974). The rule was invoked by the defendant in only
eleven reported American cases in which death occurred beyond the time limitation.
Prosecution for murder was barred in five decisions: Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24
S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 658, 134 N.E. 48 (1922); State v. Moore, 196 La.
617, 199 So. 661 (1940); State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91,318 A.2d 257 (1974); Elliot v. Mills,
335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). Apparently because of the existence of the rule the
defendant was prosecuted for the lesser offense of assault with a deadly weapon in
Commonwealth v. Pinnick, 354 Mass. 13, 234 N.E.2d 756 (1968). Pinnick was implicitly
overruled by the then PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 265, § 2 (1972)

(effective 1974). The Revision Commission specifically noted that reference to the rule was
intentionally omitted from the definition of murder to avoid adoption of the rule. Prior to
Young, the rule was rejected in People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1972)
(extension of the rule to three years and one day was found not to deny defendant a vested
immunity); People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v. Legeri, 239
App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501
(1960). After Young, the rule was abrogated in State v. Sundridge, 5 Ohio Op. 3d 419, 365
N.E.2d 898 (1977).
23. 46 IowA L. REV. 883, 885 (1961). Because the rule emanates from the common law
and because Blackstone considered satisfaction of the time requirement as an element of
homicide, it is readily understandable that courts would interpret the rule as a substantive
element of the law of murder. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 193, 166 A.2d 501, 516
(1966) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); see BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *197. Since various
state constitutions adopt the English common law and permit the high court of the state to
establish procedural rules, but withhold the authority to alter substantive provisions, the
rule has perhaps been the unintended beneficiary of constitutional sanctions. State v.
Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974). See, e.g., PA. CONsT. art. 5, § 10. The
Pennsylvania example is interesting because of the machinations contrived by its highest
court in deciding that the rule was evidentiary, thereby subjecting it to judicial abrogation.
See Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 167-75. 166 A.2d 501,503-07 (1960). Seealso note
26 infra.
24. 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
25. Id.at 97, 318 A.2d at 261.
26. See, e.g., Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (Brett, J.,
concurring. Choices available to a legislature determining the proper function of the rule
include declaring it a conclusive presumption, repudiating the rule as being obsolete,
sanctioning the rule by nonaction, extending the one year period, and recognizing "the rule
as a rebuttable presumption and thus remove adjudication of such grave matters from the
field of presumptive law and place it on the basis of fact to be determined by the jury upon
proper proof." Id. at 1115.
27. See State v. Brown, 21 Md. App. 91, 97, 318 A.2d 257, 261 (1974); R. PERKINS,
supra note 2, ch. 2, § 1 at 29; 65 DICK. L. REV. 165, 169 (1961). But see Traynor, Quo Vadis,
Prospective Overruling:A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
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Nevertheless, few legislatures have addressed the status of the
rule. 28 Some have merely codified the crime of murder without explicitly
defining it. Consequently courts have often invoked the rule to interpret
the statute, thereby effecting judicial adoption of the rule. 29 Futhermore,

defendants have raised constitutional arguments including the prohibitions against ex post facto legislation 30 and cruel and unusual punishment, 31 as well as the speedy trial guarantee 32 to prevent judicial rejection
33
of the rule. These arguments have not, however, been successful.
Despite recent affirmation of the "year and a day" rule, a gradual
trend toward its rejection can be observed. The rule was first rejected in
this country in the New York case of People v. Legeri.34 In Legeri the
court refused to apply the rule because the state's penal law was inter-

preted as an exclusive compilation and did not include the rule. In
Commonwealth v. Ladd35 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania evaluated
the rule's merits. After first deciding that the rule was evidentiary in
nature, the court concluded that its application contravened justice and
modern scientific knowledge. 36 Finally, a number of other jurisdictions
that had statutorily adopted the rule have now repealed those acts."
Courts are often so dismayed by the extent of an unnecessary evil
as to retreat into
defeatism. The case law has come to such a state, they are wont to say, that only
the legislature can set things aright. Ironically, judges themselves are all too ready
to seize on this rationalization to shift to others the responsibility of overruling
judge-made bad law.
Id. at 540.
28. See note 37 infra.
29. State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 658, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); accord, Head v.State, 68 Ga.
App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); cf. Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1112 (Okla. Crim. App.
1959) (absence of a statute of limitations for murder prosecutions supported the operation of
the rule). Contra, People v.Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v. Legeri,
239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933).
30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.3 (prohibiting passage of ex post facto legislation by
Congress); U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 10, cl. I (prohibiting passage of ex post facto legislation by
the states).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. U.S.CONST. amend VI. The contention that the speedy trial guarantee has been
violated when more than 366 days elapse between the occurrence of the criminal act and the
time the accused is brought to trial lacks merit, since the right to speedy trial first accrues
when a person becomes an "accused," and this occurs either upon arrest or when an
indictment or information is returned. See State v. Almeida, 54 Haw. 443, 509 P.2d 549
(1973). The time lapse between arrest or formal institution of proceedings thus determines
whether there has been a sixth amendment violation.
33. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166
A.2d 501 (1960), rejected the contention that judicial abrogation of the rule would violate the
prohibition against ex post facto legislation. In his dissenting opinion Justice Musmanno
addressed the sixth and eighth amendment arguments, which neither the majority or concurring opinion considered. Id. at 200, 166 A.2d at 560 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
34. 239 App. Div. 47,266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933). The Legeri court found added justification
for its decision in prior legislative acts repealing statutes that had similar effects.
35. 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960).
36. Id.at 175, 166 A.2d at 507.
37. By 1959 eleven states had statutorily adopted the rule, Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d
1104, 1109 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). Only three states have retained th e rule. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 194 (Deering Supp. 1977) (three years and one day); IDAHo CODE § 18-4008 (BobbsMerrill 1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.100 (1967).

The Young court, in a unanimous opinion, aligned itself with the
growing minority. After noting that the rule was adopted by constitutional
provision from the English common law, the court declared that the
common law persists as it was adopted until changed by legislative or
judicial decree. 38 The court explained that the initial purpose of the rule
was "not completely clear" 39 and then addressed the current impropriety
of the "year and a day" rule.
The New York 4° and Pennsylvania 4 1 cases rejecting the rule provided judicial support for the Young decision. The court further ar-

ticulated several policies favoring repudiation of the rule. It first emphasized the absence of any time limitation on murder prosecutions 42 and
reasoned that affirmance of the rule "would defeat the public policy
favoring the 'relentless prosecution of murderers.' "3
In addition to the policy implicit in statutory provisions that capital
offenders should not escape justice, the court found that modern medical
advances outdated the rule, since medical technology can postpone death
beyond a year and one day after the fatal injury occurs.' The court thus
reasoned that since medical techniques cause postponement beyond the
time limit, the rule unjustifiably ignores modern medical realities. 45
38.
148 N.J. Super. at 409, 372 A.2d at 1119.
39. Id. at 410, 372 A.2d at 1120.
40. See note 34 supra.
41. See note 35 supra.
42. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 159-2 (West 1971). The statute defining murder, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A: 113-2 (West 1969), does not refer to the rule, but merely specifies those elements
that constitute the crime. The MODEL PENAL CODE and the PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
CODE are consonant with the New Jersey statutes. Section 1.06(1) of the former code
declares there shall be no time limitation for murder prosecution. Reference to the rule is
also notably absent from the Model Penal Code definition of murder in § 210.2. The
Proposed Federal Criminal Code imposes no time restriction on homicide prosecutions in §
701 and makes no reference to the rule in its section on homicide, chapter 16.
43. 148 N.J. Super. at 412, 372 A.2d at 1121. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07,
Comment at 17 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956), in which the rationale for excluding any limitation
is the desirability of maintaining "the common police practice never to close the files on an
unsolved murder case."
Furthermore, the court emphasized the policy that capital offenders should not be
insulated from prosecution by the passage of time. It noted that in two prior cases prosecutions for murder had been precluded neither by the passage of five and one-half years since
the offense, State v. Zarinsky, 143 N.J. Super. 35, 362 A.2d 611 (App. Div. 1976), nor by the
prior conviction of the accused for lesser included offenses, State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314,
293 A.2d 57 (1972).
44. 148 N.J. Super. at 412, 372 A.2d at 1121. The Young court acknowledged that
utilization of advanced medical techniques might indefinitely prolong some vestige of life.
See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976).
45. 148 N.J. Super. at 412, 372 A.2d at 1121. See also 47 VA. L. REV. 880,884(1961).
The prosecution brief in Young addresses some interesting permutations of this problem. If the rule were in effect, the victim's decision to accept extraordinary medical
treatment could be determinative of criminal liability. Furthermore, if the victim were
incompetent this determination to sustain life would devolve upon a guardian. See In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976). The accused would have an interest in any
guardianship proceeding and would probably make efforts to intervene. Finally, "there
would be the danger that a victim or his guardian would be forced to decide between a
continuation of treatment beyond 366 days and the loss of the right to obtain lawful
retribution for homicide through the criminal process." Brief for Appellee at 36, State v.
Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977).

At the time of its promulgation the rule was not unreasonable, since

average life expectancy was not greater than thirty-four years. 46 If an
injured party died subsequent to a year and one day after the injury, the
common law served a proper function by avoiding speculation.47 The
current situation differs significantly. Average life span has been increased to more than seventy-one years,48 and when death occurs, its

cause is a matter of "scientific determination and medical proof."

49

Application of the rule exculpates the guilty and innocent alike, although
sufficient evidence bearing on the cause of death may now be available.
Certainly the Young panel realized this when it recounted that the courts

of New Jersey "have not hesitated to reject, modify or alter common law
principles when they no longer conform to present day equitable or
50
humanitarian views . . . in . . .criminal cases."Courts are generally reluctant to reject a common law criminal
doctrine. 5 The Young court did not, however, hesitate even when

confronted with a contention that abrogation would subject a criminal
defendant to an unfair hearing. The court's decision was certainly justified since abolition of the rule does not create a presumption that those
charged with murder are guilty when the victim survives for more than a

year and a day after infliction of the injury. It merely eliminates a
presumption that barred prosecution for murder when the victim lived

longer than the time limit. The decision in Young requires that the
question of causation be submitted to the fact finder, who must then make
a determination based upon all of the evidence. 52 The prosecution's
53
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains unmodified.
46. Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (Brett, J., concurring).
47. See notes 12-15 and accompanying text supra.
48. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 76
(1976).
49. Elliot v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (Brett, J., concurring);
cf. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 173, 166 A.2d 501, 506 (1960) (advances in medical
science and crime detection compelled rejection of the rule).
50. 148 N.J. Super. at 409, 372 A.2d at 1119. In Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear
Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 43-44, 141 A.2d 276, 284-85 (1958), the state supreme court observed
"The common law has always had the inherent capacity to develop and adapt itself to
current needs; indeed, if this were not true it would have withered and died long ago rather
than have grown and flourished so gloriously." Common-law criminal rules were rejected in
State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1%5) (rejecting the rule that
unlawful arrest may be resisted) and In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949) (declaring
the common-law imifunity for refusal to testify on the ground that a witness will be
disgraced did not exist in New Jersey).
51. Brief for Appellant at 14, State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117
(App. Div. 1977).
If a court considers overruling a common-law doctrine for purposes of the instant case,
the precedent must merit rejection, the new rule must be the best of all possible replacements, and the hardship on the party who relied upon the old rule must be outweighed by the
hardship on the party denied the benefit of the new rule. Traynor, supra note 27 at 560.
52. See People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 108, 191 N.E. 850,853 (1934), in which the
court notes, "An obscure or ... probable connection between an assault and death will, as
in every case of an alleged crime, require acquittal of the charge of any degree of
homicide."
53. People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3d 742, 747, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6, 9 (1972); E. Davrrr &
C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 43.03 (2d ed. 1970).

The Young court did not, however, merely abrogate the rule; it

applied its overruling decision to the defendant subjudice. In this respect
the decision was unusual, since prospective application of overruling
decisions is the general rule in criminal law. 54 Mere prospective application was denied in Young because the principles historically mandating
it, "(a) an element of reliance on the old rule by the accused, or (b) the

basic unfairness of declaring a person guilty of a crime when the act was
innocent when committed,"

5

were held inapplicable to the circum-

stances of the case. Young did not rely on the rule in guiding his conduct
and his injurious act was not innocent when committed. Therefore, the

court saw no reason to deny present application of its decision.
Although the court's conclusion certainly satisfies the retributive
instinct, it ignores the rights of the accused. If the New Jersey legislature
had to abolish the "year and a day" rule, Young could not have been
found guilty of murder because of the prohibition on ex post facto
legislation. 56 Yet the decision rendered by the court approximates such

legislative action. While an ex post facto test is not traditionally applicable to judicial decisions the court nevertheless invoked the two-pronged
test of reliance and the unfairness of retroactive criminalization.5 7 Improper application of this test, however, yielded questionable results. The
court properly determined that the reliance test would not be violated by

retroactive application of its opinion, 58 but the court's analysis of the
"innocence"

test was unfortunate. The superior court declared that

because the shooting was not innocent when it occurred, present application of the overruling decision was not unfair. The court, however,
overlooked its earlier admission that the "year and a day" rule had been
part of New Jersey law prior to Young .5 If these earlier statements merit
54. State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 413, 372 A.2d 1117, 1121 (App. Div. 1977).
See State v. Hatch, 64 N.J. 179, 313 A.2d 797 (1973); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169,
214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965).
55. 148 N.J. Super. at 413, 372 A.2d at 1121.
56. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
57. See Letter from William F. Hyland, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,
to the Supreme Court of New Jersey (Sept. 19, 1977).
Other considerations that determine the propriety of retroactive application of overruling decisions include the stability of the law, judicial efficiency, and the image of justice,
Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: ProspectiveOverruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201,
254-55 (1965), as well as the ability to accomplish the purpose of the new rule without
retroactive operation, Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1390 (1974).
58. In deciding that the reliance test would not be violated, the Young court cited
State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div. 1965). In Koonce the New
Jersey Superior Court had abrogated a common-law doctrine and held that an unlawful
arrest may not be forcibly resisted. Without discussing whether Koonce had actually relied
upon the old rule, the court refused to apply its new rule sub judice. The same court in
Young likewise declined to discuss whether the defendant had relied on the continued
existence of the rule, but determined that, in the abstract, the reliance test had been met. It
is easy to understand how, in Koonce, it would have been improper to apply a new rule of
criminal conduct when defendants may have consciously acted in reliance on the prior rule
in resisting unlawful arrests. In Young, however, it is difficult to imagine that the defendant
could have sustained an allegation of reliance as the basis for his conduct.
59. 148 N.J. Super. at 409, 372 A.2d at 1119.

credence, then at the time of the61 victim's death' Young was legally
innocent of the crime of murder.
The decision against mere prospective application of a new rule of
criminal conduct is a clear departure from the common law and may
provide the basis for reversal by the New Jersey Supreme Court. If
Young is reversed on that ground, the superior court's well reasoned
abrogation of the "year and a day" rule may, nevertheless, remain
persuasive authority.
Abrogation of the "year and a day" rule will permit prosecution of
homicide cases to proceed unimpeded by an arbitary rule. Repeal of the
rule will not create additional questions for submission to the jury.
Causation has always been an element of the crime of murder. 62 Elimination of the rule merely permits causation to remain a relevant issue in
those murder prosecutions that would have otherwise been precluded if
the rule had been applied.

CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-HUSBAND CANNOT BE

GUILTY OF RAPING

His WIFE. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386
(1977).
In State v. Smith' the Essex County Court of New Jersey held that
its rape statute 2 does not permit prosecution for rape when the perpetrator,
at the time of the offense, is legally married to the prosecutrix. 3 Although
this was a case of first impression4 and the court strongly opposed the
60.

There was no contention that the shooting was innocent, but the commission of

the murder was incomplete until the victim died. Petition for Certification at 13, State v.
Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117 (App. Div. 1977). See.F. WHARTON, supra note
5, § 17, at 17.
61. Petition for Certification at 13, State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 372 A.2d 1117
(App. Div. 1977).
62. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 7, § 68 (1972).
[Casenote by Harry A. Horwitz]
1. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977).
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (1969). The pertinent passage provides,
Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her will. . . is
guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 years, or both ....

3. Exceptions are made for separation or divorce decrees. See notes 20-22 and
accompanying text infra.
4. In In re Faas, 42 N.J. Super. 31, 125 A.2d 724 (App. Div. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 940 (1957), the court specifically stated that it would not decide the issue.
Although not express, the intention that an act by a husband against his wife is not
intended to be included may possibly be derived as a matter of historical construction of the common-law origins of the offense and from the apparently settled
principle that a defendant in a marital relationship with a prosecutrix was privileged

principle upheld, 5 it nevertheless felt bound to follow the widely accepted
common-law rule 6 that the marriage relationship precludes the conviction

of a husband for the rape of his wife. The significance of this decision lies
not in its ultimate holding, but in its unprecedented attack upon the
7
principle justifying that holding.
Albert Smith was charged with raping 8 and committing an "atrocious assault and battery" upon his wife. 9 In oral argument it was
stipulated that the defendant and the prosecutrix, Alfreda Smith, were

legally husband and wife on the date of the alleged offense. The prosecution asserted that the rape statute, by its terms, proscribes the rape of any
female, regardless of any relationship with the person charged. '0 Defendant brought a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute merely codified

the pre-existing common law and that at common law, a husband could
not, as a matter of law, rape his wife."
The Smith court, having recognized that the rape statute merely
thereby. . . But we have no occasion here to hold that such a privilege exists
under our statute.
42 N.J. Super. at 37, 125 A.2d at 727 (emphasis added).
5. The court asserted, "This court has sought to note rather forcibly its disagreement
and lack of confidence in the continued perpetuation of the common law rule here applicable." 148 N.J. Super. at 233, 372 A.2d at 393.
6. In the United States, the jurisdictions that accept the rule can be divided into three
broad categories. In several jurisdictions statutes specifically provide that rape is carnal
knowledge of a man against a woman not his wife. See, e.g., Cutler v. State, 15 Ariz. 343,
138 P. 1048 (1914); People v. Henry, 142 Cal. App. 2d 114, 298 P.2d 80 (1956); State v.
Jeanoes, 36 Idaho 810, 213 P. 1017(1923);Smurrv. State, 211 Ind. 214, 6N.E.2d 333 (1937);
Young v. Territory, 8 Okla. 525, 58 P. 724 (1899); State v. Williamson, 22 Utah 248, 62 P.
1022 (1900); State v. May, 59 Wash. 414, 109 P. 1026 (1910).
In a second group of jurisdictions the pertinent statutes do not include the "not his
wife" provision, but the courts have expressly stated that the principle applies. See, e.g.,
People v. Pizzura, 211 Mich. 71, 178 N.W. 235 (1920); State v. Pipkin, 221 Mo. 453, 120
S.W. 17 (1909); Duckett v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 100, 191 S.W.2d 879 (1946).
A final group of jurisdictions accepts the "not his wife" provision implicitly by court
decision. See, e.g., Plunkett v. State, 72 Ark. 409, 82 S.W. 845 (1904); State v. Harrison, 118
Kan. 552, 235 P. 837 (1925); Commonwealth v. Landis, 129 Ky. 445, 112 S.W. 581 (1908);
State v. Nesmith, 136 Ore. 593, 300 P. 356 (1931). For a discussion of rape laws in other
countries, see Comment, Rape and the Sanctity of Matrimony, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 415 (1967).
7. The court noted, "The principle that a husband as prime actor cannot be guilty of
rape committed upon his lawful wife appears to have been accepted without exception by
courts and authorities that have treated the subject in this country." 148 N.J. Super. at 223,
372 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added). See note 6 supra.
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 138-1 (1969). See note 2 supra.
9. 148 N.J. Super. at 222, 372 A.2d at 388. The Smith court never addressed the
question of the charge of assault and battery against the defendant, although the common
law does provide remedies for bodily injuries inflicted upon a wife by the husband in
effectuating the sexual intercourse. See Mayhew v. Mayhew, 61 Conn. 233, 23 A. 966
(1891), holding that when a husband unreasonably and brutally effects sexual intercourse
with his wife, to the injury of her health, he is guilty of "intolerable cruelty." Id. at 234, 23
A. at 967. See also, Ex Parte Kantrowitz, 24 Cal. app. 203, 140 P. 1078 (1914); SMITH &
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW at 288 (3d ed. 1973); 18 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1918); 5 TEMPLE L.Q.

142 (1930). Instead, the court addressed only the issue of whether a husband can be guilty of
raping his wife. Although the court argued throughout the case that the husband should be
held criminally liable for rape, it dismissed all charges against him, even though the issue of
assault and battery could have been tried. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
10. 148 N.J. Super. at 223, 372 A.2d at 388.
11. Id.

codifies the common law,"2 then investigated the origin of the commonlaw doctrine. The earliest and most famous rationale was articulated by
Sir Matthew Hale: "But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committ-

ed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract, the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her

husband, which she cannot retract."'

13

Proponents of the "consent doctrine" argue that consent to the
marital privilege of intercourse is irrevocably given by the wife 14 at the

time of marriage and not at the time of each act of intercourse, as is the
case with unmarried persons. Since this view is based upon the proposition that an obligation is imposed on the wife by the marital relationship,' 1 consent is immaterial. 16 Under this doctrine limited exceptions are
recognized in the event of separation, divorce, 17 or excessive cruelty in
exercising the marital right.' 8 A husband can also be held criminally

liable for rape as a principal in 9the second degree if he assists or compels
another man to rape his wife.'
12. The court reached this conclusion by comparing the common-law definition given
by Blackstone ("the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will," 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210) with the original New Jersey statute ("carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will [by] any person," L. 1796). The only
statutory modification occurred in 1898, when "and" was deleted. L. 1898, c. 235. See note
2 supra. See generally State v. Faas, 39 N.J. Super. 306, 121 A.2d 69 (Essex County Ct.
1956); State v. Sorge, 123 N.J.L. 532, 10 A.2d 175 (1940), aff'd, 125 N.J.L. 445, 15 A.2d 776
(E. & A. 1940); State v. Orlando, 119 N.J.L. 175, 194 A. 879 (1937); State v. Heyer, 89
N.J.L. 187, 98 A. 413 (E. & A. 1916).
13. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628, 629 (1847). See also Coddington, Rape of a
Wife, 96 JUST. P. 199 (1932); Howard, Rape of a Wife, 118 JUST. P. 99 (1954); Neville, Rape
in Early English Law, 121 JUST. P. 223 (1957).
14. State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 141, 560 P.2d 925, 931 (1977). See Neville, Rape in
Early English Law, supra note 13.
15. Regina v. Clarke, 33 Crim. App. 216, 217, 2 All E.R. 448, 448 (1949). See also
Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 142, 143, 86 S.W. 754, 754 (Crim. App. 1905).
16. Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23, 54 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1888) (opinion of Hawkins, J.).
See also Regina v. Clarke, 33 Crim. App. 216, 2 All E.R. 448 (1949); Baugh v. State, 402
S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966); State v. Parsons, 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926).
17. A rape prosecution was allowed in these situations on the rationale that the
judiciary, having the power to make the marriage contract, has the power to avoid it. See
note 19 infra.
18. Regina v. Miller, 2 Q.B. 282, 291-92, 2 All E.R. 529, 533-34 (1954):
[A]lthough the husband has a right to marital intercourse and the wife cannot
refuse her consent, and although, if he does have intercourse against her actual
will, it is not rape, nevertheless he is not entitled to use force or violence for the
purpose of exercising that right.
See also Mayhew v. Mayhew, 61 Conn. 233, 23 A. 966 (1891); note 9 and accompanying text
supra. See generally SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 9; 62 Yale L.J. 55 (1952); Annot., 84
A.L.R.2d 1017 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Landis, 129 Ky. 445, 446, 112 S.W. 581, 582 (1908):
"A husband may be guilty at common law as principal in the second degree of a rape upon
his wife by assisting another man to commit rape upon her, and. . . would be liable to be
punished in the same manner as the principal felon." See also People v. Chapman, 62 Mich.
280, 28 N.W. 896 (1886) (husband who watched in an adjoining room while the man he hired
to have sex with his wife did so forcibly was properly held for rape); State v. Drape, 462
S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971) (husband who helped four other men tie his wife to a bed and have
forcible sexual intercourse with her was properly held for rape). See generally 2 BRILL,
CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW, § 898, at 1441 (1923); Annot., 131 A.L.R. 1322 (1941); 75
C.J.S. Rape § 18, at 484 (1962).

While the "consent doctrine" has been accepted by many courts,20

it has caused great consternation among writers. 21 One commentator
argues that the doctrine, based on the presumption that the wife intends to
make her body accessible whenever her husband wants her, is factually
unsound and deprives a married woman of the protection of the criminal
law. 22 Another commentator contends that because marriage cannot modify the outrage of rape, the doctrine denies the woman freedom and selfdetermination. 23 There are strong policy reasons 24 for abolishing the legal

fiction of consent and for criminalizing the rape of a wife by her husband. 25 Finally, another author suggests that the judicial system is designed to test the truth of the accusation against any person, including a
26
spouse, and that the doctrine contravenes this purpose.
In contrast, the judiciary has traditionally and consistently resolved
the issue of consent by resorting to contract principles. 27 The theory is
that marriage is a voluntary contract and one of its aspects is the wife's

continuing consent to sexual intercourse. 28 In State v. Smith, the court
questioned the permanency of the consent. Mechanical application of

contract law precludes interspousal rape.29 Blind application of this superficial reasoning3" leads to "a kind of bondage of a wife," 3' a position
20. See notes 6 and 14 and accompanying text supra.
21. See generally 2 SCHLOSSER, CRIMINAL LAWS OF NEW JERSEY §§ 88:1, 88:6, at 442,
444 (3d ed. 1970); 1WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 308-312, at 639-51 (1957).
22. Comment, Rape and Battery Between a Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719,
722 (1954). The author tempers this statement later in the article as he acknowledges the
problems that result from allowing a wife to bring a rape charge against her husband,
including problems of proof and threats of prosecution to force property settlements
favorable to the wife. Id. at 722.
23. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL (1975). This author, too, acknowledges the
problems that arise from the adoption of her position.
I recognize that it is easier to write these words than draw up a workable legal
provision, and I recognize the difficulties that juries will have in their deliberations
when faced with a wife who accuses her husband of forcing her into copulation
against her will.
Id.at 428.
24. One of these policies is to protect freedom of choice. Comment, Towards a
Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 CHI. L. REV. 613, 644 (1976). This commentator
recognizes that the consent doctrine "may be justified by judicial policy decisions to avoid
the emotional issues and proof problems involved in family disputes .
Id. at 641.
25. Id.at 641.
26. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
919, 934-39 (1973).
27. See notes 13-15, 20 and accompanying text supra.
28. Marriage is thus a defense to a charge of rape. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74
Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (Sup. Ct. 1857); State v. Faas, 39 N.J. Super. 306, 121 A.2d 69 (Essex
County Ct. 1956); 44 Am. JUR. Rape § 44, at 928 (1942).
29. 148 N.J. Super. at 227, 372 A.2d at 390.
30. Id. This court also notes that a marriage contract is unlike other contracts because
"in every marriage contract, the state is an interested party." Id. (quoting PLOSCOWE, SEX
AND THE LAW 3 (1951)). This concept is not a new one: "The act of intercourse between a
man and a woman cannot in any case be regarded as the performance of a contract. In the
case of married people that act is part of a great relation based upon the greatest of all
contracts, but standing on a footing peculiar to itself." Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B. 23, 44
(Cr. Cas. Res. 1888) (opinion of Stephen, J.) (emphasis added). See also Pisciotta v.

the court found has "lost touch with the reality of the 20th century."

'32

The Smith court recognized that the right of women to govern sexual
access to their bodies is basic to civilized society and that all women are
entitled to this uniquely female right of privacy. It consequently
concluded that the rape laws discriminate against married women. 33 In
any other rape prosecution the victim's prior consent is not a defense
when she refuses to consent on a subsequent occasion. 34 This discrimination, the court reasoned, invalidates the doctrine as a basis for upholding
35
the common law.

The court next rejected the policy considerations that support the
common-law rule. The principal arguments in favor of the common-law
doctrine are the reluctance to invade the sanctity of the marriage relation-

ship,3 6 the risk of fabricated accusations, the fear of an increase in threats

Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 116-17, 91 A.2d 629, 630 (App. Div. 1952); Lindquist v.
Lindquist, 130 N.J. Eq. 11,15, 20 A.2d 325, 326 (E. & A. 1941).
31. 148 N.J. Super. at 227, 372 A.2d at 390.
32. Id. The court does admit that Hale's position was acceptable in the 17th century
setting.
It has been aptly observed that when Hale authored this proposition it was an
'accepted view of the law because at that time a valid marriage could not be
dissolved except by death, and the only way in which a marriage could be avoided
was by a private Act of Parliament.'
Id. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389 (quoting Regina v. Miller, 2 Q.B. 282, 286, 2 All E.R. 529, 531
(1954)).
Hale's position, however, is untenable today "in any society that deems itself
civilized" because of the "changes that have occurred in the status of a wife since the 17th
century" and the unsoundness of the "male dominated concepts" of the "wife as a
chattel." 148 N.J. Super. at 227-28, 372 A.2d at 390-91.
33. 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 391. See also Howard, supra note 14.
34. 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 391. See also State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 436, 67
A.2d 175, 180 (1949); State v. Parsons, 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926); 52 C.J. Rape § 26, at 1017
(1941); 75 C.J.S. Rape § I1,at 474 (1962).
The Smith court neglects to point out that even among unmarried women, testimony
about prior sexual relations between the woman and the alleged offender is competent
evidence. "[0]n a prosecution for an offense involving a sexual crime evidence of prior
offenses of like character between the same parties is admissible, notwithstanding that the
prior offenses are extraneous." State v. Calebrese, 99 N.J.L. 312, 314, 124 A. 54, 55, aff'd,
100 N.J.L. 412, 126 A. 924 (1924). Seealso State v. Cannon, 72 N.J.L. 46, 47,60 A. 177, 177
(1905), State v. Digiosla, 4 N.J. Super. 539, 68 A.2d 266 (App. Div. 1949); Comment, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 919, supra note 26, at 934-35.
Such prior sexual activity raises an "implication of consent." Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236,
238, 17 So. 286, 287 (1895); Lewis v. State, 217 Miss. 488, 491, 64 So. 2d 634, 635 (1953). See
also 44 AM. JUR. Rape § 93, at 962 (1942). That prior consent plays a significant role in
defining those who can bring a rape action is emphasized in an excerpt from the ALl MODEL
PENAL CODE § 207.4(4), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955):
A related problem arises where the parties are living together . . . although not
legally married. These problems are resolved in the text by defining "wife". . . as
including a woman living with the accused as his wife, regardless of the legal
validity of their marital status, but not including a woman living apart under a
decree of judicial separation.
Id. at 245.
35. The court noted that "the issue should not be decided on the basis of the consent
doctrine." 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 391.
36. The court did not directly address the "sanctity of the marriage relationship"
argument, despite its own observation that "there are conceptual difficulties involved in
making rape a crime between husband and wife." 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 391
(quoting Comment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, supra note 26, at 926). See note 23 supra.

of prosecution to gain favorable property settlements, and the likelihood
37
of an adverse effect on the possibility of reconciliation.
Because the criminal justice system is intended to test the veracity of

accusations, it should also operate in interspousal rape actions to prevent
fabrication." The threat of prosecution for vengeance also carried little
weight with the Smith court because the law already allows a wife to

bring charges against her husband for numerous other offenses. 39 Reconciliation, too, seems unlikely when the marital relationship has de4
teriorated to the point that the husband makes forcible sexual advances. 0

Although the Smith court refuted both the rationale and the policy
underlying the common-law doctrine, it nevertheless declined to change
the rule. 4 Rather, it determined that first, the rape statute 42 codifies the

common-law offense, and, therefore, the common-law elements should
be retained. 43 Second, when the applicable statute does not define the

crime, the common-law definition must be applied.44 Third, statutes are
construed with reference to the common law and will be strictly interpreted to avoid changing the common law. 45 Finally, the legislature is

presumed to know the common law, 46 and intent to change that common

37. Comment, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, supra note 26, at 926. See also Puttkammer,
Consent in Rape, 19 ILL. L. REV. 410 (1924); Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband
and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1954); ALl MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 34, at 245.

38. 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
See generally 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952).
39. These include assault and battery, larceny, and fraud. 148 N.J. Super. at 225, 372
A.2d at 389. This statement by the court is disturbing for the following reasons:
(1) The drastic penalty attached to rape, in comparison with the penalty for
assault or fraud, would significantly alter the bargaining power of the wife. The
seriousness of the charge increases its effectiveness as a threat (hence, as a
weapon of vengeance), particularly if chances of success are essentially comparable;
(2) The courts' allowance of one charge capable of fabrication is not, of
itself, an argument for allowing other charges capable of fabrication;
(3) The availability of other weapons of vengeance might indicate that a rape
action is not needed to protect the rights of the wife.
See notes 9 and 18 and accompanying text supra.
40. 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389. The likelihood of reconciliation appears to
be independent of a policy of encouraging reconciliation. The court apparently adopted the
view that the likelihood is so small as to be outweighed by the policy supporting a rape
action.
41. The court noted that "as a court of inferior jurisdiction, .... we feel we lack the
authority to simply ignore the settled principles of law that bind us and depart from the
common-law rule because, in our judgment, it is unfair and discriminatory." 148 N.J. Super.
at 233, 372 A.2d at 392-93.
42. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:138-1 (1969). See note 2 supra.
43. State v. Quatro, 31 N.J. Super. 51, 56, 105 A.2d 913, 915 (App. Div. 1954). See
note 12 and accompanying text supra.
44. 148 N.J. Super. at 230, 372 A.2d at 392 (quoting State v. Taylor, 46 N.J. 316, 334,
217 A.2d 1, 11, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966)). While this statement is correct, the Smith
court overlooks the fact that its rape statute does define the crime of rape. See note 2 supra,
The Taylor case cited by the court involved a sodomy statute that did not define the crime.
45. Firehouse v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 127 N.J. Super. 451, 456, 317 A.2d
755, 757 (App. Div. 1974). See also Neeled v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 229, 131 A.2d 508, 511
(1957); Carlo v. Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 3 N.J. 253, 265, 69 A.2d 734, 740 (1950); State
v. Leonardo, 109 N.J. Super. 442, 448, 263 A.2d 785, 788 (App. Div. 1970); Woodruff v.
State, 68 N.J.L. 89, 91, 52 A. 294, 295 (1902).
46. Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N.J. 341, 350, 94 A.2d 482, 486 (1953).

law must be clearly and plainly expressed. 47 Since clear legislative intent

was lacking, a 8 the court felt powerless to disturb the common law or
usurp the function of the legislature, despite a conviction that the principle was unsound. 49
Given the nature of the case and the attitude of the Smith court,

however, the analysis appears unpersuasive. The language of the statute
does not preclude the court from rejecting the common law. Since the

statute does not include the "not his wife" provision50 ordinarily associated with the common law, the court could have taken the position

that there is no manifest legislative intent to immunize a husband from
prosecution. 51 Even if the matter might fall within the statute, New Jersey
law provides that "it shall not control it, unless within the reason and
spirit also."2 The rule of strict construction for a penal statute need not

prevent a court from interpreting the statute in view of the evil sought to
be suppressed . 3 Nor should a statute be read devoid of relevant historical
and policy considerations. 54 The "legislative function" argument 5 is

equally unpersuasive, since the judiciary is as competent as the legislature
to revise an outmoded rule.5 6 This statute, which is susceptible of two
47. State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 12 N.J. 468, 486, 97 A.2d 480, 489 (1953). See
State v. Gill, 89 N.J. Super. 104, 213 A.2d 871 (App. Div. 1965). See also note 45 supra.
48. The court pointed out that § 2C: 14-6(b) of the proposed New Jersey Penal Code,
which had precluded a rape action by the wife except when it occurred between spouses
"living apart in a state of separation," § 2C: 14-6(b) (Final Report 1971), was specifically
amended, after public hearing, to require that the spouses be "living apart in a state of legal
separation or for a period of more than 18 months." Assembly Bill 642 § 2C:14-5(b), at 65
(Adopted June 14, 1976). This addition of a specific time requirement for the separation
period, the Smith court reasoned,
reflects [legislative] concern for the policy considerations in this area. . . . In
reconciling these considerations at least the Assembly has presumably not only
utilized the expertise available to it, but has also assayed public opinion. This court
must then be content to permit the collective legislative judgment to resolve this
unique and perplexing issue.
148 N.J. Super. at 233-34, 372 A.2d at 393.
49. The Smith court also rejected the prosecution's compromise suggestion, 148 N.J.
Super. at 232, 372 A.2d at 392, that the statute be construed to include both a rebuttable
presumption of consent by the wife and a requirement that more than minimum physical
violence accompany the sexual assault and explained that they "are not now elements of
rape against a non-husband defendant." Id.
50. See notes 2, 6, 28-32, 44-48 supra.
51. The court based its finding of lack of legislative intent on an amendment to the
New Jersey Model Penal Code. See note 48 supra. But a proposed penal code, which
merely amends an existing unsound common-law rule, should not outweigh a law that is, in
the court's words, "unfair and discriminatory." 148 N.J. Super. at 233, 372 A.2d at 393.
52. Associates of The Jersey Co. v. Davison, 29 N.J.L. 415,424 (1860). See also New
Jersey Builders, Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972);
Blackman v. lies, 4 N.J. 82, 71 A.2d 633 (1950), In re Merrill, 88 N.J. Eq. 261, 102 A.2d 400
(1917); Kuperschmid v. Globe Brief Case Corp., 185 Misc. 748, 58 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
53. State v. Meinken, 10 N.J. 348, 352, 91 A.2d 721, 722 (1952).
54. Coast Cigarette Sales, Inc. v. City Council of the City of Long Branch, 121 N.J.
Super. 439, 447, 297 A.2d 599, 605 (L. Div. 1977).
55. See notes 41-48 and accompanying text supra. See also note 70 and accompanying
text infra.
56. Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 241, 156 A.2d 252,255-56 (1959). Seealso Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 331 (1972) (the Court held that a penalty can be held invalid "even
though popular sentiment may favor [it]"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373

57
meanings, can be given a meaning that comports with public policy.
Finally, the court's protestation that it "lack[s] the authority to...
depart from the common law" 5 8 has little support. The common law has
been modified or overruled when it was found to be obsolete, 59 when the
"experience of the century" mandated a change, 6 0 when it no longer
served justice, 61 or when it did not conform to contemporary equitable
views. 62 Common-law rules have also been discarded when they were no
longer needed 63 and when their continued application made them an
"instrument of injustice." 64
In 1933 an important judicial opinion justifying the authority and
right of the judiciary to change existing law was rendered by the Court of
Errors and Appeals in New Jersey. The court, which decided to admit the
testimony of one spouse against the other in a divorce action based on
adultery, 65 stated in this case of first impression,
A rule of law which has existed . . . for over 150 years and has
been adopted and followed in so many of our sister states would
ordinarily strongly recommend itself for our favorable consideration. But the fact that the rule is based on a foundation
that is unsound. . takes from it the customary traditional and
precedential justification urging its adoption.
It seems to us that it is a rather serious indictment against
the great science of legal jurisprudence . . to compel one who
. . .is vested with the powers and duties of interpreting and
administering the law, to say, in limine, 'I am compelled to
decide this case against what seems to be the truth of it.' A law
which compels such a conclusion is not only impotent and
embarrassing, but is a law which, despite its tradition and
66
universality, was never justified and should not be followed.

New Jersey courts have frequently applied this rationale to decisions
overturning common-law rules. 67 An attempt to distinguish these deci(1910) ("a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth").
57. Modern Indus. Bank v. Taub, 134 N.J.L. 260, 263-64, 47 A.2d 348, 351 (1946). See
also United States v. Cook, 462 F.2d 301, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bayonne Textile Corp. v.
American Fed'n of Silk Workers, 116 N.J. Eq. 146, 172 A. 551 (1934).
58. 148 N.J. Super. at 234, 372 A.2d at 393.
59. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
60. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899).
61. Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 47, 141 A.2d 276,286 (1958).
62. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 440, 97 A.2d 390, 397 (1953).
63. In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 455, 67 A.2d 141, 147 (1949). Compare the text with the
statement of the Smith court that "itis hardly uncommon for our criminal justice system to
deal with false and fabricated charges. Indeed, our jurisprudence is designed to test the very
truth or falsity of accusations in all criminal proceedings. " 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d
at 389. See also notes 9, 18, and 36 and accompanying text supra.
64. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 487, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (quoting Long v.
Landy, 35 N.J. 44, 51, 171 A.2d 1, 4 (1%1)).
65. Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 A. 840 (1933).
66. Id. at 246, 168 A. at 841.
67. E.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (rejecting common-law
interspousal immunity for tort actions); Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959)
(discarding common-law privity doctrine for breach of covenant to repair); Collopy v.
Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958) (overturning the common-law

sions from the case at bar, by arguing that the Smith court is one of
"inferior jurisdiction, ' 68 is unconvincing, since a county court of New
Jersey also rejected the common-law "year-and-a-day doctrine." '69
Thus, it appears that the Smith court could have legitimately rejected
this long-standing common-law rule. The ultimate decision might indicate that the court was either unwilling to disrupt tradition or uncertain
that the judicial system could contend with the consequences. It is more
likely, however, that the court's strong language is intended to prompt the
legislature to action. Such a radical departure, without providing judicial
guidelines, 70 was postponed to permit the legislature to act first.
Nevertheless, the decision appears to be a subtle warning to the legisla71
ture that the court will assume the task if the legislature declines to act.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRETRIAL

PUBLICITY-WHEN CHANGE OF

VENUE SHOULD BE GRANTED DESPITE RESULTS OF VOIR DIRE.

Commonwealth v. Casper, (1977).

Pa. Super. Ct. -,

375 A.2d 737

In Commonwealth v. Casper' the Pennsylvania Superior Court delineated five elements 2 that must be considered in determining when a
immunity of a non-profit organization from tort liability); In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d
141 (1949) (striking down the common-law privilege of a witness to refuse to answer a
question on grounds of disgrace); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App.
Div. 1965) (rejecting the common-law right to resist an illegal arrest). See note 63 and
accompanying text supra; Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953) (duty of
parents to provide necessaries for their children held to be higher than the common-law
moral obligation).
68. [I]t is more properly a legislative, rather than judicial function, to determine
or redetermine the type of conduct which will constitute the substantive crime of
rape, especially when, as here, serious societal objectives, philosophical evaluations and moral judgments are involved.
148 N.J. Super. at 233, 372 A.2d at 393. See also note 48 and accompanying text supra.
69. "Our courts have not hesitated to reject, modify or alter common law principles
when they no longer conform to present day equitable or humanitarian views, and this is so
in both civil and criminal cases." State v. Young, 148 N.J. Super. 405, 409, 372 A.2d 1117,
1119 (Monmouth County Ct. 1977). The aura of Hale should not deter the Smith court from
changing the law. Hale's statements have been disregarded when they have "outworn [their]
usefulness." People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 877, 538 P.2d 247, 256, 123 Cal. Rptr.
119, 128 (1975). See also 11 TULSA L.J. 279 (1975).
70. The court, for example, furnished no guidelines to deal with problems of proof,
see notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra, and of prior consent, see note 34 supra.
71. The court significantly made the following cautious comment: -[Tlhis court is
constrained to conclude that N.J.S.A. § 2A: 138-1 does not now permit a prosecution for
rape.
... 148 N.J. Super. at 234, 372 A.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
[Casenote by Charles K. Serine]
1.

-

2.

The five elements cited for consideration by the court are as follows:

Pa. Super. Ct. -,

375 A.2d 737 (1977).

criminal defendant is entitled to a change of venue because of pretrial
publicity. The majority 3 held that a change of venue must be granted
when a review of these elements indicates that it would be impossible for

the defendant to receive a fair and impartial trial in the jurisdiction in
which the criminal proceedings were initiated. In these circumstances,
the change of venue must be granted regardless of the results of voir dire
proceedings.' Significant in the court's holding was the inclusion of the
accused's public status
prior to the alleged offense as a consideration in
5
this determination.

William Casper was the Democratic Party Chairman of Butler
County and a well known local public figure when the alleged offenses
occurred. In 1974 Casper was indicted by a special grand jury impaneled
6
to investigate alleged "macing" of state employees in Butler County.
Local newspaper coverage of the grand jury proceedings was intense and
included repeated publication of testimony received by the grand jury that
tended to incriminate Casper. 7 Before trial he petitioned for a change of
venue under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 3138 because of
this extensive publicity.' After the motion was denied, Casper was
1. The extent of the pre-trial publicity;
2. the nature of the pre-trial publicity;
3. the nature of the community which was subject to the pre-trial publicity
and where the trial was scheduled to take place;
4. the source or sources of the pre-trial publicity, including the possibility of
prosecutorial misconduct, in creating an atmosphere of hostility towards
the accused; and
5. the familiarity of the accused's name with the local populace prior to the
time when the charges were brought against him for which he is being
tried.
Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 743 (emphasis in original).
3. Three judges joined in the majority opinion. Judge Hoffman concurred in the
result and Judge Price dissented without an opinion. Judge Spaeth took no part in the
consideration or determination of the case.
4.

-

Pa. Super. Ct. at -,

375 A.2d at 743.

5. Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 743. See note 2 supra.
6. "Macing" is the process of unlawfully soliciting political campaign contributions
from state employees. It was alleged before the grand jury, and later at trial, that Casper
maintained a regular mandatory fee schedule, requiring contributions of $120.00 from
equipment operators, $60.00 from laborers, and $100.00 per piece of equipment from
equipment lessors. Casper used a variety of coercive methods to enforce these demands,
including rejection of lessor contracts, transfer of some unwilling employees, and reductions in the amounts of overtime allocated to other reluctant contributors. Id. at -, 375
A.2d at 738.
7.

8.

Id. at -,

375 A.2d at 739.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 313(a):
All applications for a change of venue shall be made to the court of the county
in which the complaint was filed. Such application may be made on behalf of the
defendant or the Commonwealth, or venue may be changed by the court, of its own
motion, when it is determined after hearing that a fair and impartial trial cannot be
had in the county in which the complaint is filed.
All jurisdictions throughout the country have some rule of court or statutory provision for
change of venue. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1033 (West 1969);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-224 (Rep. Vol. 1960).
9. Casper's alleged involvement in the macing scandal was the prime topic in the
Butler County news media from May of 1974 through his trial nine months later. Over 24
stories mentioning Casper's name appeared in print, dealing with all aspects of the case
including grand jury proceedings and testimony, indictments, the arrest of the defendant,

convicted of twelve separate charges in a week-long jury trial.' On
appeal to the superior court, Casper maintained that the trial judge's
refusal to grant a change of venue was an abuse of discretion. The
superior court agreed, holding that the pretrial publicity was so inherently
prejudicial that actual prejudice to the defendant at trial must be presumed. In reaching this conclusion, the court did not consider any
evidence of prejudice that appeared in the record of the voir dire or other
proceedings. Instead, the court held,
Because . . .the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity
was very great, and because the accused was a well known local
public figure prior to the news reports of his involvement in the
"macing" scheme and because the pre-trial publicity and trial
took place in a relatively small community where its effect
would be magnified . . .the court below abused its discretion
in refusing to grant a change of venue."
Defendant Casper's contention of inherently prejudicial pre-trial
publicity would have received little consideration from courts before
1961, since previously virtually all appellate courts deferred to the sound
discretion of the trial judge when confronted with such issues.12 New
trials were granted only when the defendant made an affirmative showing
of actual prejudice to his trial because of adverse pretrial publicity.' 3 In
1961 the United States Supreme Court departed from this general rule and
began to consider the constitutional aspects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. In Irvin v. Dowd 4 the Court for the first time reversed a state
criminal conviction because adverse pretrial publicity deprived the defendant of his constitutionally guaranteed right to an impartial trial. 15
While the majority relied on strong evidence of actual prejudice among
the jurors, 6 Justice Frankfurter intimated in a concurring opinion that
and the nature of the charges against him. There were also a number of editorials berating
Casper and his role in the scandal. In the words of the appellate court, "[T]here is no doubt
that this case received extreme and extensive publicity in Butler County." - Pa. Super. Ct.
at -, 375 A.2d at 739.
10. Id. at -,
375 A.2d at 738-39. Casper was found guilty of seven counts of
"macing," three counts of extortion, one count of solicitation, and one count of conspiracy.
He was sentenced to a prison term of one to two years and fined $11,500.00
II.
Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 743.
12. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (no abuse of discretion
demonstrated); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958) (decision of
trial judge upheld). See also Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63
HARV. L. REV. 840 (1950).
13. See, e.g., Spaulding v. United States, 279 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1960) (defendant's

affidavit insufficient); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959) (decision
within discretion of trial court).
14. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
15. Id. at 718-29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal proceedings the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "
16. In Irvin there was massive and extensive prejudicial pretrial reporting. Newspaper
articles reciting the defendant's confession to six murders and twenty-four burglaries were
received in over 95% of the homes in the venire community. Voir dire proceedings lasted
over four weeks, and the court excused 268 of 430 veniremen for prejudice. Of the twelve

jurors finally chosen, at least eight had some strength of opinion about the defendant's guilt.
366 U.S. at 725-27.

prejudice could be presumed from the nature and circumstances of the
pretrial publicity. 17
One year later the Court applied Frankfurter's Irvin reasoning in the
landmark decision of Rideau v. Louisiana.18 Ruling that pretrial publicity
can be so inherently prejudicial that actual prejudice is presumed,' 9 it
refused to require any affirmative proof of prejudice to the defendant's
case. 20 The Court moved further away from the requirement of affirmative proof of prejudice 2 in its decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell.22 The
majority held that appellate courts have the duty to make an "independent
evaluation" of the nature of the adverse pretrial publicity and are bound
to reverse the conviction and remand for a change of venue if they find

that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the publicity had prejudiced

23
the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Although the import of the Rideau and Sheppard decisions is clear,
most jurisdictions have not accepted this view. All courts adhere to the

fundamental presumption that a defendant deserves a fair trial in the
district in which he is charged. 24 Nevertheless, the majority of state and
federal courts maintain that the decision to change venue because of

pretrial publicity is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the
exercise of this discretion should not be overturned in the absence of

some affirmative demonstration of actual prejudice to the defendant's
17. How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their
minds were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter designed
to establish the guilt of the accused? A conviction so secured obviously constitutes
a denial of due process of law in its most rudimentary conception.
Id. at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
19. Id. at 727. The importance of the Rideau decision lies in the means by which the
Court arrived at its holding. The substantive holding of the case is limited by an extreme fact
situation. The defendant confessed in detail to a murder during a filmed interview with the
local sheriff. The film was then shown three times by the area television station to a
minimum viewing audience of 100,000 out of a total venire population of 150,000. "[T]his
spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was
Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded guilty to murder." Id.at 726 (emphasis in original). For
an extensive discussion of the significance of Rideau, see Burgess, The Efficacy of a
Change in Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an ImpartialJury, 42 NOTRE DAME L.
925 (1967).
20. [W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a
change of venue ....
. .[W]e
[
do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized
transcript of the voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due process
of law in this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people
who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised interview.
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 725, 726-27 (1963).
21. See notes 13-14 supra.
22. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Sheppard case was the subject of extensive sensational
news coverage on a nationwide basis. Id. at 356.
23. Id. at 362-63.
24. "The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence,
whether of private talk or public print." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)
(emphasis added).

trial. 25 Mere routine publication of news stories has not been held by any
jurisdiction to constitute sufficient cause for a change of venue. 26 Courts
are also in basic agreement about the considerations that determine
27
whether the defendant's rights were prejudiced by pretrial publicity.
In jurisdictions requiring affirmative proof of actual prejudice, appellate review concentrates on the nature and effect of the pretrial publicity as revealed during voir dire. Without some showing on the record of
actual prejudice resulting from publicity, most appellate courts refuse to
overrule the decision of the trial judge. 28 The defendant's burden of
showing actual prejudice to his case can be onerous 29 and is made more
difficult when the reviewing court limits its inquiry to an examination of
the record of the voir dire proceedings." The defendant may encounter
such widespread hostility in the venire panel that he will allow moderately prejudicial veniremen to be seated on the jury, fearing more hostile
replacements. If he later raises pretrial publicity as an issue on appeal,
however, the reviewing court may notice that the defendant failed to
25. See, e.g., State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 370 P.2d 261 (1962) (lack of sufficient
publicity); Oswald v. State, 221 Kan. 625, 561 P.2d 838 (1977) (burden of proof on defendant); State v. Harrill, 289 N.C. 186, 221 S.E.2d 325 (1976) (deference to trial court); State v.
Shawan, 77 N.M. 354, 423 P.2d 39 (1967) (demonstrative evidence in voir dire of actual
prejudice).
26. United States v. Woods, 486 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1973) (routine reporting of crime
held not to imply prejudice); Hurley v. State, - Ala. App. -, 335 So. 2d 183 (Crim. App.
1976) (publicity not inflammatory).
27. In State v. Crudrup, 11 Wash. App. 583, 524 P.2d 479 (1974), the Washington
Court of Appeals compiled the following list of venue related questions that are generally
considered by trial courts:
I. Was the publicity complained of cold, factual reporting in nature, or was it
inflammatory?
2. How much circulation of the publicity was there in the community from which
the venire was drawn?
3. How long a period of time elapsed from the initial dissemination of the
publicity in question until the trial actually commenced?
4. What degree of care was exercised in the selection of the jury, and how much
difficulty was encountered in obtaining the jury during voir dire proceedings?
5. What familiarity did the prospective trial jurors have with this publicity, and
how much effect did it have on them?
6. How did the defendant make use of challenges during jury selection, both
peremptory and for cause?
7. Did law enforcement officials have any connection with the release of this
publicity?
8. How severe was the charge against the defendant?
9. What was the size of the community population from which the venire was
drawn?
Id. at 586, 524 P.2d at 482.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Aguechi, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962) (jurors' exposure
to reports of murdered prosecution witnesses held not to demonstrate prejudice); Sergeant
v. People, 94 Col. 130, 497 P.2d 983 (1972) (insufficient exposure to prosecution's release of
grisly details); State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 489 P.2d 1310 (1971) (no abuse of discretion
despite extensive exposure to reports of murder of popular local policeman).
29. E.g., State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841, 132 So. 2d 819 (1961). A change of venue was
denied and the denial upheld as within the court's discretion, although the local paper had
published the defendant's prior record and confession, most of the jurors were friends of
the deceased, and the coroner had been quoted as saying that if there was going to be a
'necktie party," he would like to be in it.
30. See generally Austin, Prejudice and Change of Venue, 68 DICK. L. REv. 401
(1964).

exercise all of his allotted peremptory challenges and conclude that no
substantial prejudice resided in the jury panel. 3
In response to this and similar problems and in recognition of the
Rideau position that certain types of publicity can be inherently prejudicial, a growing number of state and federal courts no longer require that
the defendant show actual prejudice for a change of venue. 32 These courts
have adopted various forms of the reasonable likelihood standard promulgated by the Supreme Court in Sheppard.33 The California Supreme
Court has recognized "an unmistakable implication that appellate courts,
when their aid is properly invoked, should satisfy themselves de novo on
all exhibits and affidavits that every defendant obtains a fair and impartial
trial." 34 The court later expanded the concept of reasonable likelihood
when it held that the standard for change of venue did not require that the
35
risk of prejudice "be greater than not."
Pennsylvania's standard contains elements of both the affirmative
proof of prejudice and the reasonable likelihood doctrines. In Commonwealth v. Rolison ,36 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court outlined a two step
procedure for deciding whether to grant a change of venue on appeal. The
reviewing court must determine whether the court below incorrectly
denied the pre-voirdire motion because inherently prejudicial material
had been publicized. 37 The defendant's motion for a change of venue
31. The peremptory challenge dilemma is a particularly difficult problem for defendants in cases heavily surrounded by adverse pretrial publicity. For an extensive discussion
on this and other weaknesses inherent in relying upon the results of voir dire, see ABA
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.2, Commentary at 121-28 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as REARDON REPORT].
32. E.g., United States ex rel. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973), in which
a change of venue was granted on appeal despite the lack of any demonstrative evidence of
prejudice. See also Forsythe v. State, 12 Ohio Misc. 99, 230 N.E.2d 681 (1967), in which an
Ohio court applied the Sheppard standard of reasonable likelihood.
33. The ABA recommended the adoption of this standard in the REARDON REPORT,
supra note 31, at § 3.2. Most jurisdictions that have adopted the reasonable likelihood
standard have borrowed extensively from this section and its accompanying commentary.
But see Burgess, supra note 19, for an extensive criticism of these recommendations.
34. Maine v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728, 438 P.2d 372, 374 (1968). In
Maine the California court adopted the reasonable likelihood standard for a mandamus
review of a pretrial order denying change of venue. See Comment, Change of Venue in
Criminal Cases: Mandamus to Review a PretrialOrder, 26 WASH. & L. L. REV. 89 (1969).
The court expanded this holding to include appellate relief in People v. Tidwell, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 44, 473 P.2d 748 (1970).
35. Frazier v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798, 486 P.2d 694 (1971).
36.

-

Pa. -,

374 A.2d 509 (1977).

37. In Commonwealth v. Rolison, - Pa. -, 374 A.2d 509 (1977), the Pennsylvania
supreme Court summarized its earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Frazier, 471 Pa. 121,
369 A.2d 1224 (1977), and classified the following statements as inherently prejudicial:
I. References to a defendant's prior criminal record.
2. References to information received from police that a defendant had confessed.
3. Reports that go beyond objective reporting and become emotional and inflamatory.
- Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 512.

after voir dire, however, must be judged by an entirely different stan38
dard-he must show "actual prejudice in the impaneling of the jury."
Casper, which deals with the first stage of this process, articulates
the elements that must be considered in determining whether pretrial
publicity is so inherently prejudicial that it necessitates a change of
venue." The court in its formulation drew heavily from the reasoning of
Rideau and Commonwealth v. Pierce,10 in which Pennsylvania adopted
the Supreme Court's theory of presumed prejudice. The court adopted the
requirements from Rideau that the trial court consider the nature and
extent of the pretrial publicity.4" It added the Pierce requirement that the
particularly
source of the alleged prejudicial material be considered,
42
when the source is either the prosecutor or the police.
The final element that the court deemed significant was "the familiarity of the accused's name with the local populace prior to the time
when the charges were brought against him for which he is being
tried." 4 3 In direct contrast to other jurisdictions,' the Casper panel noted
the defendant's prior public status in change of venue requests. Recognizing that the defendant was a well renowned politician in a relatively small
the court explored the special dangers associated with
community,

prejudicial publicity about a public figure.
38.
39.

- Pa. at -, 374 A.2d at 512.
See note 2 supra.

40.

451 Pa. 190, 303 A.2d 209 (1973). See also -

Pa. at-,

375 A.2d at 740. In Pierce

inflammatory material consisting of the defendant's confession to the crime charged and his
extensive prior record were released to the news media by the police and district attorney's
offices. The court held that this was a violation of the defendant's due process rights, stating
that "there are certain procedures employed by the state which involve such a probability of
prejudice that they are deemed inherently lacking in due process." Id. at 195, 303 A.2d at
212.
41. See generally State v. Berry, - La.-, 329 So. 2d 728 (1976) (inflammatory nature
of the publicity, size and composition of the venire community, course of regular news
reporting).
42. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set the following guidelines for police and
prosecutors' releases to the press:
In accordance with these views, we rule that in this Commonwealth policemen and
members of the staffs of the office of District Attorneys shall not release to the
news media: (a) the existence or contents of any statement or confession given by
the accused, or his refusal to give a statement or take tests; (b) prior criminal
records of the accused including arrests and convictions; (c) any inflammatory
statements as to the merits of the case, or the character of the accused; (d) the
possibility of a plea of guilty; (e) nor shall the authorities deliberately pose the
accused for photographs at or near the scene of the crime, or in photographs which
connect him with the scene of the crime.
451 Pa. at 200, 303 A.2d at 215. In State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964), a
New Jersey court applied the ABA Canons.
43. -Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 743 (emphasis in original).
44. Some courts make an effort to avoid discussing the prominance of the defendants.
See United States v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975) (Presidential appointments secretary charged with "dirty tricks"); United States v.
Mandel, 431 F. Supp. 90 (D. Md. 1977) (governor of Maryland indicted, and later convicted,
of racketeering and mail fraud). In both of these cases the defendant's were extremely wellknown public figures before their alleged offenses and were subjected to tremendous
amounts of pretrial publicity, yet the courts held that these trials were not prejudiced by this
attention.
45. Commonwealth v. Casper, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 375 A.2d 737 (1977).

Because well-known persons are particularly vulnerable to
news stories about alleged wrongdoing on their part especially
in smaller communities, we would add to the factors to be
considered in determining whether pre-trial publicity had the
effect of denying a defendant a fair trial in a particular community another element; namely, the extent to which the public
was familiar with the defendant's name prior to the news stories
about his involvement in the activities for which he was ultimately tried. By so doing we are recognizing that news reports
about a person whose name is familiar to the general public and
who holds high political office are followed more closely than
are news reports about strangers, therefore magnifying the
effect of such reports. A public figure, especially a public,
political figure, is particularly vulnerable to trial by 46the press
before a witness is ever called to testify against him.

In Casper, the special vulnerability of a public figure was magnified
by the small size of the community47 and the publication of voluminous
damaging material within the community for an extended period of
time. 4 This problem is compounded by rule 1100,'9 which requires that a
defendant be brought to trial within 180 days and which limits the ability
and inclination of trial courts to grant continuances.5 0 "For that reason
the better procedure is to grant a change of venue when extensive pre-trial
publicity makes it unlikely that a defendant can receive a fair trial in a
51

particular county. "
The Casper opinion also drew attention to judicial "gag orders,"
another potential remedy for the pretrial publicity problem. Pennsylvania
adopted a rule allowing courts to control the amount and nature of pretrial
publicity in criminal cases. 5 2 A recent United States Supreme Court

decision held, however, that a similar "gag order" by a Nebraska court
46. Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 741.
47. Butler County has approximately 128,000 residents, and the jury lists are substantially smaller. Id. at-, 375 A.2d at 742.
48. See note 9 supra. The court went to some lengths to distinguish the Casper facts
from those of an earlier decision, Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283 A.2d 58 (1971). In
Hoss, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to find extremely adverse publicity inherently prejudicial because of the large size of the venire community (over one million) and the
factual basis of the reporting.
49. PA. R. CRIM. P. I100(a)(2); "Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is
filed against the defendant shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from
the date on which the complaint is filed."
50. For a general discussion of continuance as a remedy in cases of prejudicial pretrial
publicity, see REARDON REPORT, supra note 31, at 120-28. A continuance is often the best
remedy available to the court when it is apparent that the publicity surrounding the criminal
event will be of relatively brief duration and will not have a lasting effect.
51.

-

Pa. Super. Ct. at -,

375 A.2d at 742-43.

PA. R. CRIM. P. 326:
In a widely-publicized or sensational case, the Court, on motion of either party
or on its own motion, may issue a special order governing such matters as extrajudicial statements by parties and witnesses likely to interfere with the rights of the
accused to a fair trial by an impartial jury, the seating and conduct in the courtroom
of spectators and news media representatives, the management and sequestration
of jurors and witnesses, and any other matters which the Court may deem appropriate for inclusion in such an order. In such cases it may be appropriate for the
court to consult with representatives of the news media concerning the issuance of
such a special order.
52.

violated first amendment rights, 53 thus placing the legality of such rules
"in grave doubt." 54 One deficiency of the Casper opinion was its failure
to articulate the test for evaluating when some combination of the
enumerated elements is inherently prejudicial .5
As the press coverage of criminal events and proceedings has increased, 56 the issue of whether venue should be changed to an area less
saturated with pretrial publicity has become the subject of much litigation. Casper adopts the view that certain types of pretrial publicity may
be so inherently prejudicial that actual prejudice will be presumed regardless of the results of voir dire proceedings. 57 Its most original and

significant aspect is its requirement that courts consider the familiarity of
the local populace with the accused's name before the investigation as an
element contributing to the inherently prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity. While this attitude has not been expressly adopted by any other
jurisdiction,58 the increasing intrusion of the news media into all aspects
of the lives of public figures could soon justify more general acceptance.
Furthermore, the court acknowledged in Casper that venue change could
prove to be an insufficient remedy "because a situation could conceivably arise where, due to intense national media exposure, it becomes
extremely difficult to find any jurisdiction in the country where pretrial
59
publicity has not had a detrimental effect on the concept of a fair trial."
53. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
54. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 742. For a general discussion of the various
alternative remedies available to courts confronted with problems of pretrial publicity, see
Bailey & Golding, Remedies for PrejudicialPublicity, 18 FED. B.J. 56(1958); Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an ImpartialJury, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960).
55. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 376 A.2d at 742-43. The court's language seems to be
deliberately vague on this point. "If a review of these elements indicates that the pre-trial
publicity is of such a magnitude so as to make it impossible for the defendant to receive a
fair trial in a particular community, . . the court below abused its discretion in refusing to
grant the change of venue." Id. at -, 375 A.2d at 743. No mention is made of "reasonable
likelihood" in the holding.
56. See, e.g., The Sick World of Son of Sam, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1977. Over six
pages of text re-enact, analyze, and condemn the "alleged" offenses of the "accused."
57. See generally Broeder, Voir DireExamination:An EmpiricalStudy, 38 S. CALIF.
L. REV. 503 (1965), Broeder severely criticizes any reliance on the voir dire to discover the
existence of prejudice among the members of the jury panel. The results of Broeder's
survey indicate that over 80% of the questions asked during voir dire were intended to
ingratiate the attorney with the jurors. Only 20% appeared to be designed to sift out
undesirable veniremen.
58. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
59. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 375 A.2d at 742.
[Casenote by John F. Clough, III]

DISQUALIFICATION--

SCREENING"

TO REBUT THE AUTOMATIC LAW

FIRM DISQUALIFICATION RULE. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555
F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
The court of claims' in Kesselhaut v. United States 2 branded as
archaic the principle that automatically disqualifies an entire law firm
from representing a party if one of the firm's attorneys has been disqualified to avoid the "appearance of impropriety." 3 By so holding, the court
ventured into unexplored territory and rendered a long-awaited ruling that
will cause the legal profession to applaud and the public to sigh in relief.
Recognizing a need to consider the practical effects of such a practice, the
court announced that strict adherence to specific screening measures
designed to insulate a disqualified attorney from his associates can rebut
the previously inflexible rule of disqualification. 4 Instead, it substituted a
test balancing the interests of the present client, the attorney, and the
ethics of the legal profession.
A. M. Prothro, Esq., was an employee of the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) for twenty-one years, and served as General
Counsel during his last eight years. 5 Plaintiffs, a New Jersey law firm,
prosecuted a claim for the FHA during Prothro's last few years in office,
a period during which he had only limited personal contact with the
Kesselhaut firm. This contact ended in 1969 when Prothro retired and
became a partner in the Washington firm of Krooth and Altman.6 The
next year, after plaintiffs successfully terminated the claim, a controversy
arose over the amount of fees the FHA owed. Fully aware of the Krooth
firm's expertise in FHA-related matters and of Prothro's association with
them, plaintiffs asked the firm to prosecute the claim. After determining
that Prothro's recollection of the original FHA claim was incomplete, 7 the
firm accepted plaintiff's invitation. Extensive screening measures, inI. The court heard the case en banc.
2. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
3. Id. On March 29, 1976, Trial Judge Schwartz filed an Order disqualifying the law
firm of Krooth and Altman from representing plaintiffs in an action to collect fees. On
October 22, 1976, the court, en banc, reviewed the case and remanded it to Judge Hogenson,
Chief of the Trial Division, for further fact finding. Judge Hogenson submitted his report
prior to this decision.
4. Id. at 793-94.
5. Mr. Prothro was employed by the FHA from 1948 to 1969, holding the following
offices during the specified time periods: Assistant General Counsel, FHA, 1948 to 1954;
Director, Legal Division, FHA, 1954 to 1961; General Counsel, FHA, 1961 to 1969; and
Associate General Counsel, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1968 to 1969.
2 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DICTIONARY 364B, 365B (1978).
6. 555 F.2d at 792.
7. Mr. Prothro could not recall certain documents of the case that were shown to
him. Id. at 792-93.

cluding separate locked files and strict silence, were instituted to isolate
Prothro from the case.8
The strict and inflexible rule had been that once a member of a law
firm is disqualified from representing a client,' all lawyers in the firm

with which the disqualified attorney is associated are prohibited from
accepting employment from that client."0 Disqualification is intended "to
encourage and protect inviolate confidential communications between
client and attorney."" A client must be free to reveal all possible

information to his attorney without fear that a confidential statement may
someday be used to his detriment. To protect these confidences, the
courts are empowered to bar an attorney and his law firm from appearing
in court.' 2
8. From the time he disqualified himself until the time of the trial, Mr. Prothro did
not comment on the merits of the case to plaintiffs or to other attorneys in his firm. He did
not have an interest in the firm's earnings, since he was paid either a straight salary or an
hourly wage rate. An office memorandum was issued on November 10, 1976, which
provided as follows:
Mr. Prothro is to continue to have no connection with the case, all other attorneys are
not to discuss it with him and are to prevent any case documents from reaching
him, the files are to be kept in a locked file cabinet, the keys to be controlled by
Messrs. Altman and Krug and issued to other attorneys, clerks, and secretaries,
only on a "need to know" basis.
Id. at 793.
9. Judicially imposed disqualification prohibits an attorney or a law firm from representing a client in court. Big Bear Municipal Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d
919, 75 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1969) (vacating an order to disqualify an attorney from participating
in an eminent domain action).
10. See, e.g., Laskey Bros. of W. Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F. Supp.
1314 (D. Hawaii 1975); Weidlich v. Weidlich, 147 Conn. 160, 157 A.2d 910 (1960); People v.
Hanson, 290 III. 370, 125 N.E. 268 (1919); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, FORMAL
OPINIONS, No. 49 (1931) [hereinafter cited as FORMAL OPINIONS]; FORMAL OPINION 16
(1929);

ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 922 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as INFORMAL OPINIONS]; INFORMAL OPINION 855 (1965).
11. Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), dismissed,
Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cit. 1959). See, e.g., W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook
Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962)
(because defendant was a former client of the plaintiff's attorney, the court disqualified the
attorney and his entire firm, despite good faith efforts by the firm and no actual improprieties); Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and the IntraFirm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1061 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Unchanging
Rules].
For a thorough discussion of the history of attorney-client confidentiality, see 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A New Approach, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685 (1976) (discussing the four prevailing
theories of attorney-client confidentiality).
12. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). See, e.g., Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1063
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1976); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F.
Supp. 1314, 1318 (D. Hawaii 1975); Slater v. Rimar, 462 Pa. 138, 145-46, 338 A.2d 584, 587
(1975); Note, Disqualificationof Counselforthe Appearance of ProfessionalImpropriety, 25
CATH. L. REV. 343, 362 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Counsel].
For some time, federal administrative agencies have had the power to qualify attorneys
appearing before the agency. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (Patent
Office); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Herman v.Dulles, 205
F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (I.C.C.).
Generally a motion to disqualify must be submitted by a party with an interest adverse
to a party represented. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376-77 (S.D. Tex.

The generally accepted standard for disqualification is the "substantially related" test. If the former client shows that the matters of the

pending suit are substantially related to the matters in which the attorney
previously represented him, the attorney will be disqualified.

3

All that is

required is a showing that the attorney had access to confidential revelations, because disclosure of the actual information would defeat the
purpose of protecting the attorney-client privilege. 14 Evidence of access
to substantially related matters creates an irrebutable presumption that the
attorney possesses confidential information pertinent to the case. Thus,

proof that the information received has never been and never will be
adversely used is irrelevant. '5
To prevent potential abuses of office, former government attorneys
are subject to even more stringent standards. 16 The Disciplinary Rules
provide that "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employ-

ee." 17 Disqualification automatically results upon proof that the attorney
was a public employee with substantial responsibility over the same
matter at issue in the pending litigation.' 8 This rigid stand has been

criticized because of the difficulty in determining which government
1969) (memorandum opinion). Contra, Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1946)
(two attorneys disqualified sua sponte from representing defendant in a suit brought by the
Office of Price Administration because they had been working for the office when the suit
was filed).
13. T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). In this case a motion to disqualify plaintiff's attorney from an antitrust
action was granted. The court also applied the substantially related test to find the firm
retaining the disqualified attorney and the attorney retained by the disqualified attorney not
disqualified.
14. Id. at 269. An in camera session was suggested as an alternative in Consolidated
Theatres v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
15. 113 F. Supp. at 269. The substantially related test of T.C. Theatre has been
frequently followed. See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83
(5th Cir. 1976); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Doe v. A
Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375
(2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). For a thorough analysis of the evolution of the substantially
related test, see Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a FormerClient:
The Need for a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 CRI.-KENT L. REV. 525 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Ethical Considerations].
16. See Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to
that of FormerClient, 55 B. L. REV. 61,77 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Conflict of
Interests]; Disqualificationof Counsel, supra note 12, at 343, 356-60.
17.

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-101(B) (emphasis added)

[hereinafter cited as DR]. See also General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639
(2d Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's attorney disqualified from antitrust action because he was involved
in antitrust litigation as a Department of Justice lawyer); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co.,
397 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975) (substantial responsibility test disqualified plaintiff's
attorney, a former deputy district attorney); Control Data Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1970) (former Department of Justice attorney not disqualified); ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-3 [hereinafter cited as EC].

18. DR 9-101(B) is a revision of Canon 36, whose key words were "investigated or
passed upon."

interests require disqualification'
puted to the entire firm.

9

and the fiction that knowledge is im-

A former government attorney cannot be held to the same
rules of imputed knowledge and inferences of receipt of confidences arising from access to related data which bind attorneys
in private practice, who have easily definable clients and law
firms. In place of those automatically disqualifying inferences,
a test which requires a factual showing of actual knowledge or
strong likelihood of receipt of knowledge should be substituted
20

Furthermore, pragmatists claim that automatic disqualification, which is
premised upon an attorney's intimate daily contacts with his partners and
associates, is an outdated concept. 2' Compartmentalization has evolved

with the growth of large law firms and has made actual communication of
client confidences virtually impossible.22 A growing number of firms
have adopted the same approach practiced by Krooth and Altman-they
have used screening procedures to isolate the disqualified member, while
agreeing to represent the client.23 Other firms apply the automatic dis-

24
qualification rule only to partners, not to associates or office-sharers.
Moreover, partners of disqualified attorneys have occasionally been per19. The basic problem of the former government attorney
is not merely to identify the former client here, which is in a larger sense the United
States Government in toto, but rather to identify the interests with respect to
which the attorney represented the client, for it is only as to these interests that he is
disqualified.
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (emphasis added).
The United States sued to recover oil sales overcharges to Europe financed by ECA.
United States moved to disqualify the firm representing plaintiff, because a partner was
General Counsel of ECA Paris branch during the alleged overcharging. The motion was
denied because insufficient knowledge was imputed to the attorney. See generally Kaufman,
The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L.
REV., 657, 665 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman].
20. Kaufman, supra note 19, at 667 (emphasis added).
Cf. Federal Conflict of Interest Act, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1962), dealing with the disqualification of former government officers and their post-employment partners in the following
manner: First, the attorney is permanently barred from matter in which he "personally and
substantially" participated when in government service; and second, the attorney is barred
for one year from representing a matter in which the government has an interest, if the
matter was within the official responsibility of the attorney.
The Senate refused to adopt a clause of the House Bill, H.R. No. 8140 (1961),
preventing a law firm from engaging in activities for two years if one of its attorneys is
permanently barred from the activity. S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin
[1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3852, 3861-62.
21. Unchanging Rules, supra note 11, at 1075.
22. Id See also Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1976) (firm
representing plaintiff not disqualified even though it employed an attorney who had worked
in the firm that represented defendant).
23. [T]his injunction against representation by the firm of a disqualified attorney
seems often to be ignored in connection with members returning from government
service; while the individual lawyer will abstain from work touching upon his
government responsibilities, his firm continues to accept these matters.
Unchanging Rules, supra note I1, at 1059-60 (footnotes omitted).
The practice is supported by the results of a Yale Law Journal survey. Id. at 1070 n.59a.
24. Id. at 1072. See, e.g., Laskey Bros. of W. Va. Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224
F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn.
1961), aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136
F. Supp. 345, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

mitted by the courts to verify the oath of a disqualified attorney's client by
affidavit.25.

In response to the apparent revolt against automatic disqualification,
the courts have ordered disqualification with increasing vigor 26 only when
it is based on a failure to avoid the "appearance of impropriety," even
though actual unethical conduct may not in fact exist. 27 This movement

was encouraged by the adoption by the ABA in 1969 of the Code
prohibition governing former government attorneys. 28 The Ethical Con-

sideration promulgated by the Bar Association provides, "After a lawyer
leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept
employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial
responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give

the appearance of impropriety even if none exists. "29 Even though this
guideline is not mandatory, the courts have occasionally extended the
30
principle to justify the disqualification of an entire law firm.
Although the justification for more strict enforcement was intended
to restore the public confidence in the legal profession, such a "serious
remedy" should be imposed only after weighing all the interests. A court
confronted with such a request has a
responsibility to preserve a balance, delicate though it may be,
between an individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel
and the need to maintain the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility. This balance is essential if the public's
trust in the integrity of the Bar is to be preserved.3
The adoption of the "appearance of impropriety" test,32 coupled with the

growing concern about the ability of the profession to control the conduct
of its members, has tipped the balance against the profession. 33 As
25. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 199 Mo. App. 439, 203 S.W. 654 (1918); Geisweit v.
Marden, 4 Lyc. 293, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 697 (1954).
26. See, e.g., American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 984 (3d Cir. 1975) (no
appearance of impropriety, attorney qualified); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (an appearance of impropriety requires prompt action by the courts);
Control Data Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1970) (failure of the
substantially related test or the substantially responsible test creates an appearance of
impropriety).
27. "On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may appear to laymen to be unethical."
EC 9-2. See Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972)
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). See also, e.g., Miller Elec. Const. Inc. v. Devine Lighting
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1020, 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
28. Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
29. EC 9-3. See also Ethical Considerations,supra note 15, at 540; DR 9-101; note 50
infra.
30. Compare Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F. Supp. 1085 (3d Cir. 1976)
(disqualified attorney may not substitute an associate for himself) with Akerly v. Red Barn
System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1977) (disqualified attorney's co-counsel not disqualified).
31. Slater v. Rimar, 462 Pa. 138, 150, 338 A.2d 584, 590 (1975). See also Emle Indus.,
Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973); Pa. P. & L. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
36 Leh. 461, 462 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
32. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
33. E.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975). "It is incumbent upon
us to preserve, to the greatest extent possible . . . the public's interest in maintaining the

significant as appearances have become, however, there are other important matters that must be considered in ruling upon disqualification. 34
The retaining client has an interest in being represented by the best
legal talent in the field. 35 "[W]hen an attorney has acquired a knowledge
of government procedure and an understanding of the Government's

viewpoint through employment with it, he will be of greater value to
future private clients.''36 Additionally, court-ordered disqualification
usually causes the abandoned client to experience undue hardship through

37
delay, inconvenience, and increased expense.
Generally, the interests of the former client require disqualification
to prevent disclosure of confidential material.3 8 Despite the concern of

Canon Four about maintaining the secrecy of attorney-client confi-

dences, 39 prior confidentialities can be protected by screening while still
yielding to other important values.' When the prior client is the Government, additional ethical constraints are imposed "to ensure that people in
positions of public trust are not influenced in the performance of their
duties by the expectation of subsequently using their positions for private
gain."' 4

Nevertheless, as a former client, the Government also has

interests against disqualification.
[U]nless government service could be followed by a reasonable
possibility of private practice, many lawyers would refuse to
work for the government. The government may be more
concerned with attracting legal talent by insuring mobility after
government service than with protecting its confidential relahighest\standards of professional conduct and the scrupulous administration of justice." Id.
at 569.
34. See Baglini v. Pullman, 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1158
(3d Cir. 1976).
35. See Canon v. United States Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. Il1.
1975), modified, 532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); In re Trimble's Estate, 392 Pa.
277, 140 A.2d 609 (1958) (attorney and firm not disqualified, because disqualification would
have imposed severe hardship on the client). But see note 33 supra.
36. Kaufman, supra note 19, at 668. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136
F. Supp. 345, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Note, Disqualificationof Attorneys for Representing
Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 927 (1955).
37. Attorney's Conflict of Interest, supra note 16, at 65; Disqualification of Counsel,
supra note 12, at 343, 344 n.5.
38. Note, Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former
Clients, 64 YALE L.J. 917, 927 (1955). See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
39. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4, states as follows: "A
lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
40. Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality:A New Approach, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685,
699 (1976).
For a discussion of other options seeking to accomplish the same purposes, see
Unchanging Rules, supra note I1,at 1070-79. "Reconstruction of the firm into separate
partnerships for conflict of interest purposes or splitting a firm in order to represent
concurrently conflicting interests, . . . could lead a sharing or appearance of sharing the
forbidden confidences." Id. at 1074. But see Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[A] 'Chinese Wall' cannot be built within a single
law firm." Id. at 96).
41. Attorney's Conflict of Interest, supra note 16, at 77; accord, United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); FORMAL OPINION supra note 10,
134 (1935); INFORMAL OPINION supra note 10, 647 (1963).

tionship with its lawyers. . . . A flow of information between
the government and the outside, generated by attorney mobility, is of great value both to the government and to the private
interests
represented by attorneys, as well as to attorneys them4 2
selves.

Restricting a former government attorney from practicing his learned
specialty limits his mobility.4 3 Isolating a law firm from an area of the law
because one of its associates has acquired his expertise in that area as a
public employee subjects an experienced attorney to unnecessary disad-

vantages and casts unjustified hardships upon the law firm." Likewise,
the future of a young attorney joining the Government may be severely
jeopardized. 4
The court in Kesselhaut recognized the severe deterrent effect the

strict rule of disqualification has on the acceptance of government employment by promising young attorneys.4 6 The court's sole authorities,
however, were two advisory opinions of professional ethics committees.
Opinion 342 interprets Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), which, as amended in
1974, reads as follows: "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment [under DR 5-105] under a

DisciplinaryRule, no partner, or associate [of his or his firm], or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment."- 47 The opinion clearly requires that DR 5-105(D) be read
in light of DR 9-101(B), appearance of impropriety, and all other interests.4 8 According to the Committee, application of the amended Discipli-

nary Rule to disqualification by appearance of impropriety is a questionable practice. 4 9 Since DR 5-105(D) is not intended to disqualify the entire
42. Unchanging Rules, supra note 1I, at 1066 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
See also General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974) (disqualification of a former government attorney would "chill the ardor for Government service by
rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ." Id. at 651); Kaufman,
supra note 19, at 668; S. REP. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3852, 3861-62.
43. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (attorney
barred from suing the largest textile company in the world); Consolidated Theatres v.
Warner Bros. Cir. Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) (attorney disqualified
from practicing his specialty, motion picture antitrust).
44. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Kaufman, supra note 19, at 668. See also Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 232 F.2d 199
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956) (lawyers should not be subject to recurrent
harassment through disqualification proceedings). Disqualification also interferes with the
law firm's pecuniary interests in obtaining new clients. Ethical Considerations,supra note
15, at 536-37.
45. Kaufman, supra note 29, at 668.
46. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
47. Deleted material is set forth in brackets and material added by the amendment is
italicized.
The amendment is slowly achieving national acceptance. It was adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on April 29, 1977.
48. See FORMAL OPINION, supra note II, No. 342 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OPINION
342]; 31 RECORD OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 552 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as OPINION 889].
49. See COMMIF-rEE ON LEGAL ETHICS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, Tentative

Government when a federal attorney is disqualified by one of the disciplinary rules s° the rule should not be any more stringent on law firms
employing former government attorneys. 5 By isolating a disqualified
attorney from handling a certain matter, the appearance of impropriety
among the other attorneys of the law firm could be avoided. The ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility concludes by insisting that disqualification should not extend beyond the attorney when
52
sufficient screening procedures are strictly followed.

Opinion 889 deals with the sufficiency of specific screening procedures used by the firm. 53 Stating that "a factual analysis involving an
examination of the circumstances of each case is necessary if disservice is
not to be done to the government, the legal profession and the public

through an overbroad and simplistic application of the Disciplinary
54 the Committee
Rule, ,
presented a probing list of interrogatories design55
ed to serve as guidelines in a disqualification determination.
The court in Kesselhaut chose to adopt the views proposed by both
opinions in toto.56 It explicitly emphasized the importance of considering
the interests of the present client, the attorney, the law firm, and the
Government. "[A]n inexorable disqualification of an entire firm for the
disqualification of a single member or associate, is entirely too
harsh. .. .,,5 The court, en banc, recognized the need to strike a
balance on a case by case basis, especially when, as in the instant case,
"truly unethical conduct has not taken place and the matter is merely one
Draft Opinion for Comment, Inquiry 19, 1 DisT. LAW. 39 (1976). But see OPINION 889, supra
note 48, at 556-69 (highlighting the flaws in the argument of the D.C. Draft Opinion).
50. E.g., DR 4-101 (preservation of confidences); DR 5-105 (impairment of an attorney's independent judgment); DR 9-101(B) (appearance of impropriety).
51. OPINION 342, supra note 48, at 11.
52. Id. at 10-12.
53. OPINION 889, supra note 49, at 566.
The opinions differ to the extent that Opinion 342 leaves the determination of the
sufficiency of the screening procedures to the government agency implicated, while Opinion
889 suggests a submission of the issue to the courts. Id.
This aspect of Opinion 342, coupled with the rationale of Trial Judge Schwartz, see note
3 supra, prompted the waiver discussion in Kesselhaut. The court construed Opinion 889
broadly and announced that even if a government agency consents to a screening procedure,
the courts are not bound to accept it. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 794 (Ct. C1.
1977) (per curiam).
54. OPINION 889, supra note 48, at 570.
55. Id. at 570-71. The opinion included the following questions that can serve as
guidelines: What was the degree and nature of the disqualified lawyer's responsibility for
the matter while he was in government service? How long has it been since the disqualified
lawyer had any contact with the subject matter? What was the firm's competence in the area
involved prior to the arrival of the disqualified lawyer? If any discussions were held with the
disqualified lawyer, did he do anything more than state his inability to handle the matter
personally and refer the client to a nondisqualified attorney in the firm? What steps were
taken by the firm to ensure the isolation of the disqualified lawyer from forbidden matters?
What steps were taken to eliminate any pecuniary interest that the disqualified lawyer might
have in fees arising from the matter?
56. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793-94 (Ct. Cf. 1977) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 793. The trial judge had applied the criticized rule to disqualify the Krooth
firm. Id.

of the superficial appearance of evil, which a knowledge of the facts will
dissipate.'"'" In this case interests favoring disqualification could "be59
mitigated by appropriate screening" that was "specific and inflexible."
Noting that the insulating measures had proved to be efficacious, 6° the
court acknowledged that the procedures 6l effectively counterbalanced
appearances.
Kesselhaut recognized that outdated practices were yielding unjust
and impractical results. By holding that sufficient screening can rebut the
long-standing automatic disqualification rule, 62 the court attempted to
conform ethical standards to ethical practices. Substitution of a balancing
test for automatic disqualification 63 assures the public that its confidences
will not be breached and announces to the legal profession that ethical
conduct will not go unnoticed. If the Kesselhaut rule achieves the widespread acceptance it deserves, then attorneys and firms will no longer
have to fear the effect of automatic disqualification on good faith, ethical
conduct.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court ultimately vacated Trial Judge Schwartz' Order and remanded the
case, instructing the Trial Division to proceed with plaintiff's claim.
61. See note 8 supra.
62. 555 F.2d at 793-94.
63. Id.
[Casenote by James H. Richardson, Jr.]

